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1675 
STOP AND FRISK IN A CONCEALED CARRY WORLD 
Shawn E. Fields 
Abstract: This Article confronts the growing tension between increasingly permissive 
concealed carry firearms legislation and police authority to conduct investigative stops and 
protective frisks under Terry v. Ohio. For decades, courts upheld stops based on nothing more 
than an officer’s observation of public gun possession, on the assumption that anyone carrying 
a gun in public was doing so unlawfully. That assumption requires reexamination. All fifty 
states and the District of Columbia authorize their citizens to carry concealed weapons in 
public, and forty-two states impose little or no conditions on the exercise of this privilege. As 
a result, officers and courts can no longer reasonably assume that “public gun possession” 
equals “criminal activity.” 
Courts and scholars have begun addressing discrete aspects of this dilemma, and this 
Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it corrects the oft-repeated 
misconception that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence has 
altered the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion standard. Second, it articulates the need 
for a “gun possession plus” reasonable suspicion standard to initiate a Terry stop for a 
suspected firearms violation. Third, it defends the right of officers to conduct automatic frisks 
of suspects after a lawfully-initiated stop when firearms are present, in recognition of the 
inherent and unique dangerousness of these weapons. The Article concludes with a recognition 
of the risks presented by a proposed “automatic frisk” regime, particularly for over-policed 
communities of color. In doing so, it suggests law enforcement would be well served to 
consider community policing alternatives to stop and frisk that respect the rights of firearms 
carriers in marginalized communities while protecting officers on the beat. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few doctrines have strained the interpretive bounds of the Fourth 
Amendment or influenced the relationship between police officers and 
civilians more than “stop and frisk.”1 “The Fourth Amendment was once 
considered a monolith,” where “‘[p]robable cause’ had a single meaning” 
and “‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ were all-or-nothing concepts.”2 But when 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Terry v. Ohio3 that a police officer could 
“seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons”4 on 
nothing more than reasonable suspicion,5 the Court “broke [this monolith] 
entirely.”6 In the half century since Terry, the controversial practice has 
                                                     
1. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 261 
(6th ed. 2013) (“In terms of the daily activities of the police, as well as the experiences of persons ‘on 
the street,’ there is probably no Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case of greater practical impact 
[than Terry v. Ohio].”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the 
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (1988) (“The . . . challenges of Fourth 
Amendment interpretation are formidable standing alone, and the Court’s decision[] in . . . Terry v. 
Ohio ha[s] compounded the difficulty.”).  
2. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES 
AND PERSPECTIVES 388 (6th ed., West 2017) (quoting DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 261). 
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
4. Id. at 15. 
5. Id. at 30. 
6. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 388; see also Sundby, supra note 1, at 385 (“Faced with 
novel Fourth Amendment questions, the Court in . . . Terry turned to a broad reasonableness standard 
and an ill-defined balancing test for the immediate solutions . . . . significantly undermin[ing] the role 
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become synonymous with the beat tactics of the country’s largest 
metropolitan police force,7 exacerbated rifts between zealous (or worse) 
officers and distrustful communities of color,8 and diminished the once-
dominant warrant requirement to second-class Fourth Amendment status.9 
The “stop and frisk” standard is deceptively easy to describe, if nearly 
impossible to apply with any precision. As the Court explained in Terry, 
an officer may (1) seize an individual for a brief investigatory stop upon 
“reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in, or is about to be 
involved in criminal activity,”10 and (2) frisk the outer clothing of the 
individual for weapons if she has “reason to believe that [s]he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual.”11 This “reasonable suspicion” 
standard necessary to justify a stop and frisk is low: “‘considerably less 
than proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ 
than is necessary for probable cause.”12 
                                                     
of probable cause and set[ting] the stage for long-term expansion of the reasonableness balancing test 
without proper justification or limits.”).  
7. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that a 
sevenfold increase in stop and frisks “was achieved by pressuring commanders at Compstat meetings 
to increase the number of stops,” and that “commanders, in turn, pressured mid-level managers and 
line officers . . . by rewarding high stoppers and denigrating or punishing those with lower numbers 
of stops”); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness 
of New York City “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1500–20 (2014) (providing a “historical 
account of NYC stop and frisk”). 
8. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 263 (“[T]here can be no gainsaying that when the 
police forcibly stop persons on the street to question them or to conduct full or cursory searches, 
highly sensitive issues of racial profiling . . . come to the fore.”); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue 
Encounters” – Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 255 (“[P]olice encounters involving black men contain a combination of fear, 
distrust, anger and coercion that make these encounters unique and always potentially explosive.”); 
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1275–76 (1998) (“When one examines the history and modern exercise of police 
‘stop and frisk’ practices, the old adage ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same,’ aptly 
describes the experience of many black men when confronted by police officers.”). 
9. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016) 
(arguing that scholars are “incorrect” to presume that “reasonableness—and not a warrant 
requirement—lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment,” instead distinguishing that 
“[r]easonableness does lay at the heart of the Fourth Amendment, but what it meant was that, outside 
of apprehending a known felon, a warrant would be required”). Like Professors Maclin, Donohue, 
and Sundby, I harbor grave reservations about the soundness of Terry and its progeny. But for 
purposes of this Article, I recognize the established precedent of Terry and make suggestions within 
that existing stop and frisk framework. 
10. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011). 
11. Id. 
12. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 7 (1989)); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“[R]easonable 
suspicion . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”). 
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In large part because of this low and malleable “reasonable suspicion” 
standard, the permissible scope of the stop and frisk practice has expanded 
significantly since Terry. While Terry involved an on-the-street stop of a 
would-be robber casing an establishment with a gun bulging from his 
coat,13 since then the Court has upheld an officer’s ability to frisk 
individuals stopped for minor traffic violations who are suspected of 
carrying weapons,14 search car compartments within “the lunge area” of 
the stopped individual,15 arrest suspects for refusing to affirmatively 
identify themselves during a Terry stop,16 and initiate a stop based on a 
mistake of law.17 
But in the last decade, this near linear expansion of pre-arrest 
investigative powers has been stymied from an unlikely source—the 
Second Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
recognizing an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms for personal protection18—and concurrent increase in the number of 
states authorizing concealed and open carry of firearms in public19—has 
forced a reexamination of traditional stop and frisk jurisprudence.20 
                                                     
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1968). 
14. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (“[M]ost traffic stops . . . resemble, in duration 
and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry. . . . [T]raffic stops are especially 
fraught with danger to police officers.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
15. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983) (holding that the principles of Terry 
“compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile . . . is 
permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief . . . that the suspect is dangerous and the 
suspect may gain immediate control of weapons”); United States v. Morris, No. 95-50158, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 45162, at *2 (5th Cir. May 2, 1996) (citing Michigan v. Long to uphold officer’s 
protective search of “the ‘lunge area’” of a suspect’s car for weapons). 
16. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 178, 189 (2004) (but explaining that 
“an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the identification request is not 
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop”). 
17. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (observing that the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard allows for officers to make reasonable mistakes of fact regarding 
criminality or dangerousness, and finding that “[t]here is no reason . . . why this same result should 
[not] be acceptable . . . when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law”). 
18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008) (recognizing an individual’s right to 
keep and bear arms for self-defense and other lawful purposes under the Second Amendment); 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (holding that the individual right to keep and 
bear arms applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
19. David Kopel, Growth Chart of Right to Carry, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 17, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/17/growth-chart-of-
right-to-carry/?utm_term=.f1753d60a71b [https://perma.cc/WNA4-SR6T] (describing dramatic 
increase in states providing “objective and fair procedures for the issuance of concealed handgun 
carry permits” between 1986 and 2014). 
20. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“Perhaps 
the most immediate impact of expanding gun rights on policing tactics is legal uncertainty regarding 
what police can do when they observe, or learn of, a person carrying a firearm.”). 
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“Before the Court’s decision in [District of Columbia v.] Heller,21 there 
was a widely-held ‘assumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon 
was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession,’” thus 
justifying a stop under the first Terry prong.22 Moreover, there was once 
“nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be dangerous,” 
giving officers the right to frisk armed individuals on the basis of this 
“blanket assumption of dangerousness.”23 But in a post-Heller world, 
where more than forty states have little or no restrictions on the public 
concealed carry of firearms,24 courts can no longer assume that public 
handgun possession is unlawful.25 Moreover, “holes have begun to appear 
in the blanket assumption of dangerousness that courts used to apply to 
firearms and their carriers.”26 
This Article explores the growing tension between increasingly 
permissive “right to carry” laws throughout the country and the rights of 
officers to safely conduct investigative stops and searches. In doing so, 
the Article makes three contributions to the existing literature and offers 
a word of caution about the conclusions it reaches. 
First, it corrects a misconception often repeated by courts and scholars 
that Heller directly forces a reexamination of Fourth Amendment stop and 
frisk doctrine.27 Heller did nothing more than recognize an individual’s 
                                                     
21. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
22. Matthew J. Wilkins, Armed and Not Dangerous? A Mistaken Treatment of Firearms in Terry 
Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2017); see also Bellin, supra note 20, at 25 (“Traditionally, 
courts (and police) assumed that officers could stop and question someone they observed with a 
concealed handgun, at least in jurisdictions with strict regulation of concealed weapon carrying.”). 
23. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1170. 
24. Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/ 
[https://perma.cc/A536-U56E] (summarizing concealed carry laws by state and noting that twelve 
states require no permits to carry concealed weapons in public and thirty additional “shall issue” states 
require permits but allow little or no discretion in the issuance of the permits). 
25. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t., 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’ There is no 
‘automatic firearm exception’ to the Terry rule.”); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 
2000) (comparing an officer’s stop of an armed individual in a concealed carry state based on a 
suspicion that possession might have been illegal as to a stop of an individual because he “possessed 
a wallet, a perfectly legal act”). 
26. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1171. 
27. See United States v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 208 (4th Cir. 2016) (“As public possession and 
display of firearms become lawful under more circumstances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
police practices must adapt. Within the last decade, federal constitutional law has recognized new 
Second Amendment protections for individual possession of firearms.”), rev’d, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 
2017) (en banc); United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., 
concurring) (“After Heller and McDonald, all of us involved in law enforcement, including judges, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and police officers, will need to reevaluate our thinking about these 
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right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes under the Second 
Amendment. It said nothing about any right to, or prohibition against, 
carrying concealed firearms in public, which remains the salient feature 
of firearms-based weapons searches under Terry.28 Rather, officers and 
judges must reconsider the nature of “reasonable suspicion” in light of 
increasingly permissive state gun-possession laws authorizing public 
concealed carry, a trend dating back at least thirty years. 
Second, the Article defends the premise that gun possession alone is no 
longer sufficient to justify a Terry stop and articulates a new “gun 
possession plus” reasonable suspicion test for investigative seizures. In 
this sense, the Article seeks to swing the pendulum towards gun carriers 
in recognition of the sensible (and increasingly true) presumption that 
those carrying firearms in public are doing so lawfully. 
Third, in recognition of the inherent dangerousness of firearms and 
enhanced safety risks to officers and the public of increased public 
handgun presence, the Article advocates for an officer’s ability to conduct 
an automatic frisk for weapons after a lawful stop and upon reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect is armed. While some lower courts have implied 
that armed individuals are per se dangerous for purposes of Terry’s second 
prong,29 this Article suggests a shift away from the perceived and 
subjective dangerousness of the individual and towards the inherent and 
objective dangerousness of the firearm. This subtle analytical shift 
produces several benefits, including eliminating dependence on unreliable 
empirical data about the criminal propensities (or lack thereof) of 
concealed carry permit holders, reducing subjective and often 
unconscious invidious judgments about the dangerousness of suspects of 
color and other marginalized groups, and injecting some much-needed 
common sense about the risks of firearms. 
                                                     
Fourth Amendment issues and how private possession of firearms figures into our thinking.”); Bellin, 
supra note 20, at 26 (“The post-Heller argument that a person’s possession of a firearm cannot alone 
constitute reasonable suspicion to justify a stop is simply stated.”). 
28. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2007) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms . . . in sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings.”); cf. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Heller “does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-
defense outside the home”). 
29. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 700 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (upholding 
frisk of armed individual because “the officer reasonably believed that the person stopped ‘was armed 
and thus’ dangerous” (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977))); United States v. 
Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding protective frisk of suspect because “Officer 
Ferragamo’s reasonable suspicion [was] that Orman was carrying a gun, which is all that is required 
for a protective frisk under Terry”). 
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At the same time, the Article recognizes the potentially negative 
consequences of advocating for an “automatic frisk” regime, particularly 
when the very practice of “stop and frisk” has become increasingly 
synonymous with racially charged police abuses.30 An officer who stops 
a person of color may be more likely to suspect, implicitly or explicitly, 
that the person is armed and search that individual in a situation where he 
might not search a white suspect. Accordingly, the Article concludes with 
a cautious acknowledgement of the risks of advocating for automatic 
frisks and suggesting that law enforcement consider not just what is 
legally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, but also what makes 
sense as a matter of sound community policing. The logic of Terry 
justifies the automatic frisk of a gun carrier for the protection of the officer 
under current reasonable suspicion analysis, a fact that, if widely adopted, 
could lead to a dramatic increase in the number of warrantless frisks 
conducted by police officers. This prospect understandably may cause 
concern for civil libertarians and communities of color, given the terrible 
history of racially discriminatory stop and frisk practices over the last half 
century. While not retreating from its primary conclusions, the Article 
acknowledges that legitimate concern, and suggests that law enforcement 
consider alternatives to traditional frisk practices in the presence of a 
citizen with a firearm. 
I. DUELING AMENDMENTS: TERRY STOPS AND EXPANDING 
GUN RIGHTS 
A. The Stop and Frisk Paradigm: Origins, Justifications, Evolution 
For nearly 180 years, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focused 
primarily on the warrant requirement and whether arrests were properly 
based upon probable cause.31 That changed with Terry, which “provided 
                                                     
30. One need only consider the tragic case of Philando Castile, a lawfully armed African-American 
man shot to death during a traffic stop after announcing he had a firearm but was only reaching for 
his identification, to recognize that no objective standard can eliminate the grave risks facing men of 
color during police interactions. Mr. Castile, who had previously been stopped fifty-two times for 
traffic infractions, was shot seven times by Officer Jeronimo Yanez while reaching for his driver’s 
license, and later died on Facebook Live while his girlfriend filmed the encounter. Mark Berman, 
What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said About the Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-
who-shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fce8a35388c2 
[https://perma.cc/7ZRV-KXBC]. Yanez was later acquitted of manslaughter. Id.  
31. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 1, at 262 (observing that the 1967 case Camara v. 
Municipal Court changed the focus of the Fourth Amendment from warrants based on probable cause 
to a “general Fourth Amendment standard of ‘reasonableness’”). 
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the impetus, as well as the framework, for a move by the Supreme Court 
away from the proposition that ‘warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable,’ to the competing view that the appropriate test of police 
conduct ‘is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but 
whether the search was reasonable.’”32 This shift from “probable cause” 
to “reasonable suspicion” was momentous. Despite the Court’s attempt to 
minimize the purportedly “quite narrow” scope of the holding, Terry 
ironically expanded police power far more than a decade of friendly 
Warren-era decisions did for the rights of criminal defendants.33 
Terry represented what would become a typical stop and frisk case—
an on-the-street observation by an officer of a suspected violent crime. A 
Cleveland beat cop observed two men standing on a street corner, then 
proceeding back and forth along an identical route multiple times in front 
of a department store, stopping each time to look inside the store 
window.34 Each completion of the route was followed by a conference 
between the two on the corner.35 The two men eventually joined up with 
a third individual two blocks from the store.36 Suspecting the individuals 
of “casing a job, a stick-up,” the officer stopped the three men and asked 
their names.37 When the men “mumbled something,” the officer spun 
around suspect John W. Terry and patted down his outside clothing, 
feeling a pistol in his overcoat pocket.38 After removing a revolver from 
Terry’s coat pocket, he patted down the other two suspects and seized 
another revolver.39 
The Court found that the officer’s actions amounted to a “search and 
seizure” under the Fourth Amendment—that the officer “seized” Terry 
                                                     
32. Id. (citations omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968) (holding that lawful police 
encounters can exist “which do[] not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and 
yet which stop[] short of an arrest based on probable cause”). 
33. RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE 
FORCE 55 (2014) (quoting contemporaneous national newspapers criticizing the Warren Court for 
“‘wrapp[ing] its flowing robes around all prisoners so as to virtually immunize them’ from police 
interrogations,” then observing that “[i]ronically, the Warren Court’s last controversial criminal 
justice decision [Terry] actually expanded police authority”); Maclin, supra note 8, at 1275 (“The 
irony, of course, is that the police power to ‘frisk’ suspicious persons is the product of a Supreme 
Court that did more to promote the legal rights of black Americans than any other court.”). 
34. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6. 
35. Id. at 6. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 6–7. 
38. Id. at 7. 
39. Id. 
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when he stopped him on the street,40 and “searched” him when he patted 
down his outside clothing.41 But despite the absence of a warrant or any 
exigent circumstances previously recognized by the Court as obviating the 
warrant requirement, the Court upheld the propriety of the officer’s 
actions, observing that the Fourth Amendment protects only against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.42 The Court defined reasonableness 
as an objective test from the officer’s perspective: “[W]ould the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search ‘warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was 
appropriate?”43 On the facts presented, the Court found that the officer, 
utilizing his years of experience apprehending thieves, had reasonable 
suspicion to suspect a crime was about to take place, and thus to stop the 
individuals.44 Moreover, the Court found that the particular crime 
suspected by the officer—a “stick-up”—made it reasonable for the officer 
to assume the individuals were armed and dangerous.45 
Importantly, the Court emphasized that “[t]he sole justification of the 
search . . . is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it 
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed 
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault 
of the police officer.”46 This pat down of the outer clothing “by no means 
authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else 
in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled 
by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is 
essential.”47 
“Terry created a two-pronged analysis, with the first prong governing 
the propriety of the initial investigatory seizure and the second prong 
                                                     
40. Id. at 16 (“Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”). 
41. Id. (“[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find 
weapons is not a ‘search.’”). 
42. Id. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).  
43. Id. at 21–22 (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion. . . . If subjective ‘good faith’ alone were the test, the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.” (citations omitted)). 
44. Id. at 30. 
45. Id. at 28 (“[T]he record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an 
investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible 
danger, and took limited steps to do so.”). 
46. Id. at 29. 
47. Id. at 16 n.12 (quoting State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966)). 
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governing the propriety of any subsequent frisk.”48 These analyses are 
distinct and must be undertaken separately; the satisfaction of one prong 
cannot serve as justification for the second prong. Under the first prong, 
an officer may stop an individual (the seizure) if she has reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.49 Under the second prong, an officer may 
frisk the individual (the search) if she has reasonable suspicion that the 
person “is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”50 
Because these analyses are distinct, an officer may reasonably suspect a 
person is committing a crime but lack the requisite suspicion that the 
individual is armed and dangerous, and vice versa.51 
Since Terry, the Court has applied the “reasonable suspicion” standard 
to expand an officer’s ability to stop and frisk individuals in less 
suspicious and dangerous contexts. The Court has held that a traffic stop 
for a motor vehicle infraction counts as a “stop” despite the absence of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.52 Moreover, any traffic 
violation, no matter how minor, can serve as a legitimate basis for the 
traffic stop.53 Once stopped, pat-down searches can be conducted on 
drivers or passengers,54 and officers can also expand the search beyond 
the person to car compartments.55 Known as frisking “the lunge area,”56 
the Court explained that an officer may protect himself by searching any 
areas from which the suspect could grab a weapon.57 
                                                     
48. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1168 (First, “to initiate an investigatory seizure, a police officer must 
have a reasonable suspicion that the person being stopped ‘ha[s] engaged, or [is] about to engage, in 
criminal activity.’” Second, to search the individual, a police officer must have a reasonable suspicion 
that “he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual”). 
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. 
50. Bellin, supra note 20, at 30. 
51. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (“[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an 
encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, 
to make a forcible stop. . . . [T]he person addressed . . . certainly need not submit to a frisk for the 
questioner’s protection.”); United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
an officer may not conduct a protective search to allay a reasonable fear that a suspect is armed without 
first having a reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop); United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 
998, 1000–01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding protective frisk violated the Fourth Amendment because 
officers had no reasonable suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal activity). 
52. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2008). 
53. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996). 
54. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. 
55. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).  
56. United States v. Morris, No. 95-50158, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 45162, at *2 (5th Cir. May 2, 
1996) (citing Michigan v. Long to uphold officer’s protective search of “the ‘lunge area’” of a 
suspect’s car for weapons). 
57. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. 
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In 2004, the Court upheld an officer’s arrest of an individual who 
refused to identify himself during a Terry stop, despite serious concerns 
about the infringement of Fifth Amendment privileges against self-
incrimination.58 And in 2014, the Court ruled 8-1 that a Terry stop does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment even if the reasonable suspicion 
developed by the officer was premised on a mistake of law.59 These cases 
appear to confirm fears that, far from representing a “narrow” ruling, 
Terry opened a “Pandora’s box” of broad and sweeping police 
investigative powers in conflict with the originally intended primacy of 
probable cause and the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.60 
B. Stop, Frisk, and Firearms 
When the Court decided Terry in 1968, American attitudes towards the 
public possession of firearms differed significantly from today.61 During 
that time, strict control and regulation of gun possession was a bipartisan 
issue, with prominent members of both parties supporting the near-total 
elimination of public firearm possession.62 Even the president of the 
National Rifle Association testified before Congress in favor of strict 
firearms regulations, stating “I have never believed in the general practice 
of carrying weapons . . . . I do not believe in the general promiscuous 
toting of guns. I think it should be sharply restricted and only under 
                                                     
58. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188–91 (2004). 
59. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).  
60. Esther Jeanette Windmueller, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion – The Demise of Terry v. Ohio 
and Individualized Suspicion, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 549, 564 (1991) (decrying the “Pandora’s 
box” opened by “Terry and its companion cases” and arguing for a new standard for individualized 
suspicion so that “the individual security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be retained, 
sealing the lid to the Pandora’s box of privacy-encroaching monsters”). 
61. See, e.g., Guns, GALLUP NEWS, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3FR2-ELPW] (providing historical public opinion data about gun regulation). In 
one historical trend noted by Gallup, 60% of Americans supported the outright ban of handguns in 
1959, but by October 2017 support had fallen to 28%. Id. 
62. On August 8, 1967, the U.S.House of Representatives passed by a 378-23 margin the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which among other things strictly limited interstate 
transfers for handguns and raised the minimum age for buying handguns to twenty-one. To Pass H.R. 
5037, The Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act of 1967, as Amended, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/90-1967/h107 [https://perma.cc/XH9X-JG5X]. The Senate 
passed the bill on May 23, 1968, by a 72–4 margin. To Pass H.R. 5037, After Substituting for its Text 
the Language of S. 917 as Amended, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/90-
1968/s439 [https://perma.cc/Q5DV-MCQC]. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into law on June 
19, 1968, nine days after Terry. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 34, 42, 47 U.S.C.). 
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licenses.”63 Perhaps most famously, on March 2, 1967, when heavily 
armed members of the nascent Black Panther Party, led by co-founders 
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, marched at and inside the California state 
capitol to protest a bill repealing a law allowing the public carrying of 
loaded firearms (and thus inadvertently launching the modern gun rights 
movement),64 Governor Ronald Reagan declared that he saw “no reason 
why on the street today a citizen should be carrying loaded weapons.”65 
The following year, four months after the Court’s ruling in Terry, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Gun Control Act of 
1968,66 which significantly restricted interstate firearms transfer and 
further limited public possession of firearms.67 
Within that context, one can understand why an officer reasonably may 
have suspected criminal activity was afoot when she observed, 
discovered, or received a tip about an individual’s possession of a firearm 
in public. An officer could reasonably suspect that a public gun possessor 
was committing a weapons possession offense because most states either 
tightly constricted or prohibited the public carrying of firearms.68 As a 
result, courts routinely upheld Terry stops based on nothing more than 
suspected gun possession.69 This assumption, combined with the once 
“nearly unanimous agreement that to be armed was to be dangerous,” 
provided the necessary justification to conduct an automatic frisk of 
public gun possessors.70 But in the current rapidly-changing, gun-friendly 
deregulatory environment, these assumptions require reconsideration. 
                                                     
63. Michael S. Rosenwald, The NRA Once Believed in Gun Control and Had a Leader Who Pushed 
for It, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/05/the-forgotten-nra-leader-who-
despised-the-promiscuous-toting-of-guns/?utm_term=.2f93fcd1fb0a [https://perma.cc/X2PN-
KHV7]. 
64. Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ 
[https://perma.cc/YGT9-C4ER]; see also Jad Abumrad, The Guns Show, RADIOLAB PRESENTS: 
MORE PERFECT (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/gun-show 
[https://perma.cc/Q6XB-XBVM].  
65. Winkler, supra note 64. 
66. The Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2012)). 
67. Id. 
68. See infra notes 83–91; Bellin, supra note 20, at 31 (describing the widely held “assumption that 
a person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession”). 
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. H.B., 381 A.2d 759, 762, 769 (N.J. 1977) (finding that an anonymous 
phone tip “giving a general description and location of a ‘man with a gun’” constituted reasonable 
suspicion to stop and frisk the suspected individual). 
70. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1170–71 (describing the “blanket assumption of dangerousness” 
under which most officers and courts traditionally operated with respect to gun possessors). 
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C. Rethinking “Reasonable Suspicion” in a Concealed Carry World 
Needless to say, public opinion about gun rights and gun control have 
changed since the standoff between Ronald Reagan and Bobby Seale in 
1967. In part owing to this shift, an increasing number of states have 
relaxed or eliminated restrictions on public firearm possession.71 
Beginning in the 1970s, shortly after the Black Panthers first prominently 
utilized the Second Amendment as an instrument of individual gun 
possession rights, the National Rifle Association followed suit, electing in 
1977 an executive vice president who “would transform the NRA into a 
lobbying powerhouse committed to a more aggressive view of what the 
Second Amendment promises to its citizens.”72 And in the last decade, the 
Court has delivered significant victories to the gun rights movement, 
declaring in two landmark cases that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to possess a firearm for self-defense or any other lawful 
purpose,73 and that this protection applies to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.74 These two significant changes 
challenge the once-reasonable assumption that a public gun carrier is a 
dangerous lawbreaker. 
1. Gun-Friendly Legislation 
States’ public gun possession laws broadly fall within one of four 
“right-to-carry” categories: 
                                                     
71. Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun 
Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680–88 (1995). 
72. Winkler, supra note 64. Winkler also observes the following: “[This] new NRA . . . shared 
some of the Panthers’ views about firearms. Both groups valued guns primarily as a means of self-
defense. Both thought people had a right to carry guns in public places . . . . They also shared a 
profound mistrust of law enforcement.” Id. 
73. Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, 
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. L.J. 1, 6 (2009) 
(observing that Heller delivered a significant victory for gun rights advocates and “imperiled [the] 
case for gun control”). 
74. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–60 (2010) (discussing the well-known doctrine of 
“selective incorporation,” wherein only those most fundamental of constitutional rights apply to 
restrict the actions of both the federal and state governments and recognizing the “fundamental” 
nature of the individual right to keep and bear arms as one restricting the states). 
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Unrestricted: State law allows individuals to carry concealed firearms 
for lawful purposes without a permit.75 These states are sometimes 
referred to by gun rights advocates as “constitutional carry” states.76 
Shall Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in 
public, but the granting of such licenses is nondiscretionary and subject 
only to meeting determinate criteria set forth in the law.77 
May Issue: State law requires a license to carry a concealed firearm in 
public and provides the issuing entity with discretion over the issuance of 
a permit.78 This discretion varies significantly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.79 
No Issue: State law does not allow any private citizen to carry a 
concealed handgun in public, with very few limited exceptions.80 
As recently as 1988, forty states either prohibited the public possession 
of firearms (sixteen “no issue” jurisdictions) or tightly regulated such 
possession (twenty-four “may issue” jurisdictions).81 Over the next thirty 
                                                     
75. Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra Incognita” of Discretionary Concealed Carry Laws, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 918–27 (2015) (discussing types of concealed carry jurisdictions); Kansas: 
Permitless Carry Bill To Be Heard Tomorrow on Senate Floor, NRA-ILA (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150224/kansas-permitless-carry-bill-to-be-heard-tomorrow-on-
senate-floor [https://perma.cc/V457-URKU] (discussing pending “constitutional carry” or 
“permitless carry” legislation in Kansas). 
76. CBS 13, Maine Lawmaker Submits “Constitutional Carry” Bill, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Feb. 
26, 2015, 7:26 PM), https://bangordailynews.com/2015/02/26/news/state/maine-lawmaker-submits-
constitutional-carry-bill/ [https://perma.cc/WGH7-EGE4]; see also Charles C. W. Cooke, Vermont: 
Safe and Happy and Armed to the Teeth, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 24, 2014, 8:21 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/396857 [https://perma.cc/XDN3-9UAZ] (noting that 
“constitutional carry” is sometimes referred to as “Vermont carry” because Vermont for decades was 
the only state in the country that did not require a permit to carry a concealed firearm in public). 
77. Enright, supra note 75, at 919–20 (“As the name suggests, shall-issue laws require the issuing 
authority to issue a permit to an applicant who meets delineated requirements. There is little discretion 
on the part of the issuing body.”); see also Walter Ricksaw, What Is the Difference Between Shall 
Issue and May Issue?, CONCEALED CARRY CLASS, http://www.concealedcarryclass.net/what-is-the-
difference-between-shall-issue-and-may-issue/ [https://perma.cc/B7PS-E7LZ]; Nancy Thorne, What 
is the Difference Between “May Issue”, “Shall Issue”, “No Issue” and “Unrestricted” Concealed 
Carry Laws?, NAT’L CARRY ACAD. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.nationalcarryacademy.com/ 
mayissueshallissuenoissue/ [https://perma.cc/VW2H-QSLZ]. 
78. See Enright, supra note 75, at 921–23. 
79. See id. at 921 n.188, 922 (observing that some “may-issue laws . . . are applied more like shall-
issue laws” (like Alabama), but that “[o]ne of the strictest may-issue laws is found in New York”). 
80. See generally id.; Ricksaw, supra note 77; Thorne, supra note 77. See also Enright, supra note 
75, at 923 (“A no-issue state is one that requires, but does not issue, permits for public carry.”). 
81. As of 1988, eight states were “shall-issue” jurisdictions. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1988) 
(enacted 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(a) (1988) (enacted 1959); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(2) (Supp. 
1988); IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3 (1988) (enacted 1985); ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 2003(1) (1988) (enacted 
1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1) (1988) (enacted 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7 
06 - Fields (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:26 PM 
2018] STOP AND FRISK 1689 
 
years, states across the country began relaxing their public concealed and 
open carry laws:82 
Table 1: 
Number of States with Concealed Carry Laws by Year 
Year Unrestricted Shall Issue May Issue  No Issue 
199083 1 15 20 14 
199584 1 27 14 8 
200085 1 30 12 7 
200586 2 35 9 4 
201087 3 36 9 2 
201588 7 35 8 0 
                                                     
(1988) (enacted 1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070 (1988). Vermont was the lone unrestricted 
jurisdiction. Cooke, supra note 76. 
82. Cramer & Kopel, supra note 71 at 685 (“Since 1987, states have increasingly adopted a new 
breed of concealed handgun permit laws that make easier the process for many adults to get a permit 
to carry a concealed handgun.”). 
83. In 1990, Tennessee switched from “no issue” to “may issue.” 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 905, 
§ 3 (codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351 (West 2018)); Cramer & Kopel, supra 
note 71 at 705–06. That same year, six states—Oregon, Idaho, West Virginia, Mississippi, Georgia, 
and Pennsylvania—became “shall issue” jurisdictions. See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 71 at 686–
707 (summarizing concealed carry handgun law changes from 1987 to 1995). 
84. Four states became “shall issue” jurisdictions in 1994: Alaska, Arizona, Tennessee, and 
Wyoming. See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 71 at 686–707. Seven states became “shall issue” 
jurisdictions in 1995: North Carolina, Nevada, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, and Utah. See 
id. 
85. Three states became “shall issue” jurisdictions in 1996: Kentucky, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina. 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 119, § 1 (codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(4) 
(West 2018)); 1996 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess., No. 4, § 1 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:1379.3(A)(1) (West 2018)); 1996 S.C. Acts 464 (codified as amended S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-
31-215(A)–(C) (West 2018)). 
86. Six states became shall issue jurisdictions between 2001 and 2005: Michigan (2001); Colorado, 
Minnesota, Missouri, and New Mexico (all 2003); and Ohio (2004). 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 638 
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1) (2018)); 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 372, 
§ 5b (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b(7) (West 2018));  2003 Minn. Laws 
No. 842 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 624.714(2)(b) (2018)); 2003 Mo. Laws 2nd Ex. Sess. 
(codified as amended at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.101(1) (2018)); 2003 N.M. Laws ch. 255, § 4 (codified 
as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4(A) (2018)); 2004 Ohio Laws (codified as amended at 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D) (West 2018)). Also, in 2003, Alaska became the second state 
in the country to become an “unrestricted” jurisdiction. 2003 Alaska Sess, Laws ch. 62 (repealing 
Alaska’s concealed carry permitting requirements, ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700). 
87. Nebraska and Kansas became shall issue jurisdictions in 2006. 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 32, 
§ 3 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c03 (2018)); 2006 Neb. Laws § 4 (codified as 
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2430(3)(b), 69-2433 (2018)). Arizona became the third 
unrestricted jurisdiction in 2010. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 59, § 2 (codified as amended at ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(a) (2018)).  
88. Three states became shall issue jurisdictions between 2011 and 2015: Wisconsin (2011), Iowa 
(2011), and Illinois (2013). 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws (codified as amended at WIS. STAT. § 175.60 
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Year Unrestricted Shall Issue May Issue  No Issue 
201789 13 29 8 0 
 
As reflected above, as of 2015, every state and the District of Columbia 
allow the public concealed carry of firearms.90 The vast majority of these 
states are now unrestricted or shall-issue jurisdictions, in which there are 
little to no restrictions on an individual’s ability to lawfully carry a firearm 
in public.91 These “increasingly permissive gun-possession laws erode the 
assumption that public handgun possession is unlawful.”92 “[A]s public 
possession and display of firearms become lawful under more 
                                                     
(2018)); 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 47 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 724.7(1) (2018)); Illinois 
Enacts Nation’s Final Concealed-Gun Law, USA Today (July 9, 2013), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/07/09/illinois-enacts-concealed-gun-law/2503083/ 
[https://perma.cc/LK2Y-E6T8]. Wyoming (2011), Arkansas (2013), Kansas (2015), and Maine 
(2015) became unrestricted jurisdictions. 2011 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 84, § 1 (codified as amended at 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b) (2018)); 2013 Ark. Acts § 1 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-73-309 (2018)); 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 231 ch. 16, § 8 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-7c03 (2018)); 2015 Me. Laws ch. 341 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
25, § 2003(1) (2018)). 
89. Six additional states became unrestricted jurisdictions in 2016 and 2017: Idaho, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 208, 
§ 1 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(3)(f)) (2018)); 2017 N.H. Laws (codified 
as amended at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6 (2018)); 2017 N.D. Laws ch. 428, § 2 (codified as 
amended at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 62.1-02-04–62.1-02-05, 62.1-04-01–62.1-04-05) (2018)); 2016 
Miss. Laws (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-7(24) (2018)); 2016 Mo. Laws 
(codified as amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 571.030 (2018)); 2016 W. Va. Acts ch. 252 (codified as 
amended at W. VA. CODE § 61-7-3 (2018)). 
90. GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 24 (“Every state—as well as the 
District of Columbia—allows the carrying of concealed weapons in some form.”). 
91. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3112; 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129; IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-3302(1); IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3; IOWA CODE § 724.7(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
7c03; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(A)(1); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 25, § 2003(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425b(7); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(2)(b); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-9-101(6)(c); MO. REV. STAT. § 571.101(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-321(1); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 69-2430(3)(b), 69-2433; NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6(I)(a); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4(A); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.12; N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03(1); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125(D); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.12(A)(12); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 166.291; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(e)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215(A)-(C); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23-7-7; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.02; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.070; W. VA. 
CODE § 61-7-4; WIS. STAT. § 175.60; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(b). In addition to these forty state 
statutes, Alabama and Connecticut “by statute allow considerable police discretion but, in practice, 
commonly issue permits to applicants who meet the same standards as in “shall issue” states.” Drake 
v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 441 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-
11-75; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(a). 
92. Bellin, supra note 20, at 25 (“Consequently, the Fourth Amendment authority flowing from 
that assumption must be reevaluated.”). 
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circumstances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and police practices 
must adapt.”93 In particular, “when a state elects to legalize the public 
carry of firearms, . . . the Fourth Amendment equation changes, and 
public possession of a gun is no longer ‘suspicious’ in a way that would 
authorize a Terry stop.”94 But while increasingly permissive gun laws may 
require a reexamination of the first Terry stop prong, the same logic does 
not necessarily apply to the “armed and dangerous” second prong of Terry 
as discussed in Part III. 
2. Heller and McDonald 
Further challenging these old assumptions, the Court affirmatively 
recognized for the first time a constitutional right for individuals to keep 
and bear arms for lawful purposes. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 95 the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a Washington, D.C., law 
prohibiting all citizens (except for law enforcement officers) from 
possessing handguns and requiring all lawfully-owned rifles and shotguns 
to be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock.”96 Prior 
to Heller, the Court had never expressly opined on the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protections for the individual right to “keep and bear 
Arms”97 as opposed to the right of a “well regulated Militia”98 to do so.99 
Writing for a bare majority, Justice Scalia used the opportunity to 
engage in an in-depth historical and textual analysis of the Second 
Amendment, something that had been missing from the Court’s previous 
opinions.100 Rejecting the restrictive view that the Second Amendment did 
                                                     
93. United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
94. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) 
(“Permitting such a justification for a Terry stop . . . would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections 
for lawfully armed individuals in those states.”). 
95. 554 U.S. 570 (2007). 
96. Id. at 574–75. 
97. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
98. Id. 
99. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (“In Heller, the Supreme Court found for 
the first time that this language secured an individual, and not just a collective, right to bear arms.”). 
100. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581–628; see also Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the 
Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1286 (2009) (“Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, began with a painstaking exegesis of the [Second] Amendment’s text—an exercise that 
occasionally crossed into pedantry.”). Prior to the 1960’s, the Second Amendment was rarely litigated 
and broadly viewed as an archaic military amendment like the “runt” Third Amendment. See 
Abumrad, supra note 64 (discussing quiet history of Second Amendment prior to 1970); Radley 
Balko, How Did America’s Police Become a Military Force on the Streets?, ABA J. (July 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_americas_police_become_a_military_force_
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nothing more than grant the people the right to form a militia and for that 
militia to be armed, Justice Scalia determined that the Amendment 
protected an individual right in addition to a right of the people to form an 
armed militia.101 The Court found that implicit in an individual’s right to 
keep and bear arms was the right to self-defense with a firearm and the 
right to have a working firearm in the home.102 While recognizing that 
some important limitations existed on this right,103 the Court firmly held 
that “a complete prohibition [on the] use [of firearms] is invalid.”104 
Heller left open the question of whether the Second Amendment’s 
protections are incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, given Washington, D.C.’s special status as a federal 
district.105 The Court addressed that issue two years later in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago,106 finding that the Second Amendment did in fact apply 
to the states as well as the federal government.107 Justice Alito, writing for 
the majority, explained that the individual right to keep and bear arms 
should be incorporated and applied against state and local governments, 
because the right was both “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” 
and “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition.”108 In so doing, 
the Court opined that “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ 
of the Second Amendment right.”109 But like Heller, the Court in 
McDonald only considered the right to private possession of firearms in 
one’s home and left open for another day the scope of the right to possess 
firearms in public.110 
                                                     
on_the_streets [https://perma.cc/8KHN-AT5K] (“You might call [the Third Amendment] the [‘]runt 
piglet[’] of the Bill of Rights Amendments—short, overlooked, and sometimes the butt of jokes.”).  
101. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“The phrase ‘keep arms’ was not prevalent in the written documents 
of the founding period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing 
the right to ‘keep arms’ as an individual right unconnected with militia service.”). 
102. Id. at 599 (finding that “self-defense . . . was the central component of the right itself”). 
103. Id. at 626–27 (“Nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”); see also id. at 627 (limiting the right 
to arms that are “in common use,” leaving it open to states to regulate and ban certain types of assault 
weapons and weapons commonly useful only in military service). 
104. Id. at 629. 
105. Id. at 620 n.23 (noting that “incorporation” is “a question not presented by this case”). 
106. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
107. Id. at 776. 
108. Id. at 767. 
109. Id. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). 
110. Id. at 786. 
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While these seminal opinions clearly carry significant weight for gun 
rights jurisprudence broadly, they carry far less relevance for the Fourth 
Amendment stop and frisk analysis than courts and scholars have argued 
post-Heller.111 In neither case did the Court opine on whether the Second 
Amendment’s protections extended to the public possession of 
firearms.112 By leaving open the question, the Court may have further 
“opened the door for the carry laws we have today,”113 though as noted 
above that door had begun opening decades before Heller. Because the 
overwhelming majority of stop and frisk cases involve encounters 
between police officers and individuals in public, the Court’s refusal to 
extend constitutional protections to public firearm possession renders 
Heller and McDonald of little use in helping officers determine whether 
reasonable suspicion exists to stop a public gun carrier. In other words, 
without a clear pronouncement that public gun possession is 
constitutionally-protected per se, the decisions should not change the 
calculus of an officer deciding whether to stop and frisk a public gun 
carrier.114 
What should change the calculus instead are the public carry laws in 
force in the jurisdiction where the potential encounter takes place. In an 
unrestricted or “constitutional carry” jurisdiction where no state limits 
exist on the right to carry firearms in public, officers arguably cannot 
demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminality based solely on firearm 
                                                     
111. See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2015) (invalidating frisk of 
backpack on suspicion that it contained a gun in light of “important developments in Second 
Amendment law”); Bellin, supra note 20, at 26 (admonishing courts to require more in the “reasonable 
suspicion” analysis under Terry’s first prong given that mere gun possession as become an 
“increasingly common activity that is not only lawful, but specifically protected by the Second 
Amendment”). 
112. See Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (addressing a challenge 
to the State of New York’s handgun licensing scheme, and “proceed[ing] on this assumption” that the 
Second Amendment right recognized in Heller “must have some application in the very different 
context of the public possession of firearms” (emphasis added)); Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect 
a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2008) (reviewing 
Heller and “finding substantial grounds in the opinion for extending the holding to public possession 
and some grounds for limiting it to the home” (emphasis added)). 
113. Nadia Maraachli, The Fourth Amendment Shall Prevail, Come Heller High Water, 94 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 75, 79 (2017). 
114. At most, the individual could point to the general constitutional right to keep and bear arms 
for lawful purposes, including for self-defense, and argue that he publicly possessed his firearm in the 
exercise of that right. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down 
public handgun ban because Heller “does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-
defense outside the home”). But whether he was doing so lawfully would depend on the public right-
to-carry law of the individual state jurisdiction, not the Court’s opinions in Heller and McDonald. See 
id. (recognizing state’s authority to determine what type of public carry laws to implement). 
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possession.115 Likewise, in “shall-issue” and “may-issue” jurisdictions, it 
would appear difficult for an officer to determine with any reasonable 
particularity that a crime is or will be committed solely based on the actual 
or potential presence of a firearm.116 Without any other indicia of 
criminality giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that some non-weapons 
possession offense was being committed, the officer likely would have to 
resort to asking the individual for proof of a gun permit. But without 
reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop, what right under the first Terry 
prong would an officer have to demand such information?117 
As laws authorizing public concealed carry of firearms become the 
norm rather than the exception, officers and courts must reexamine 
previously-held assumptions about reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry 
stop and frisk based solely on suspected handgun possession. The next 
section articulates a balanced approach to this brave new world, one which 
requires additional indicia of criminality to initiate a stop but authorizes 
automatic frisks for (and temporary disarmaments of) firearms during a 
lawful stop. 
II. THE CASE AGAINST AUTOMATIC STOPS OF GUN 
CARRIERS 
To initiate a stop, an officer must have “reasonable suspicion supported 
by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”118 For decades, 
the only “articulable fact” on which an officer needed to rely was the 
possession of a firearm, based on the assumption that the possession itself 
was unlawful.119 But gun possession alone no longer reasonably indicates 
unlawful activity in a concealed carry world, despite the low 
“reasonableness” standard articulated in Terry.120 
                                                     
115. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that to allow stops of all 
armed persons in a permissive concealed carry jurisdiction “would effectively eliminate Fourth 
Amendment protections for lawfully armed persons”). 
116. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 2015) (“While open-
carry laws may put police officers . . . in awkward situations from time to time, the Ohio legislature 
has decided its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets. The Toledo Police 
Department has no authority to disregard this decision—not to mention the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment—by detaining every ‘gunman’ who lawfully possess a firearm.”). 
117. See Bellin, supra note 20, at 38–39 (discussing constitutional problems with “gun-license 
inquir[y]” statutes). 
118. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
119. See State ex rel. H.B., 381 A.2d 759, 762 (N.J. 1977); Bellin, supra note 20, at 31. 
120. Bellin, supra note 20, at 26 (“Courts will be hard-pressed to accept, as constituting ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ of a crime, an observation of an increasingly common [and lawful activity].”). 
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Therefore, reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop requires more 
than the mere presence of a firearm.121 At a minimum, some other 
independent indicia of criminality should be present to justify a stop under 
Terry. An imperfect analogy can be drawn from Illinois v. Wardlow,122 
where the Court found that neither presence in a high-crime neighborhood 
nor unprovoked flight standing alone created reasonable suspicion, but the 
two together did.123 The suspicious activity of being in a “high crime area” 
is insufficient to conclude that a crime is being committed, as is the 
suspicious activity of evading police officers.124 But in combination, what 
begins as “little more than a hunch”125 becomes reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.126 
Likewise, courts should impose a “gun possession plus” requirement to 
justify a Terry stop. The presence of a firearm, standing alone, creates 
nothing more than a hunch that an individual possesses the gun unlawfully 
or otherwise is engaging in criminal activity.127 But possession plus some 
other suspicious activity may very well create the necessary reasonable 
suspicion under Wardlow to stop the gun carrier.128 
                                                     
121. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (finding unconstitutional search of individual 
based solely on tip that he was carrying a firearm and declining to adopt a “firearm exception” to 
Terry stops); Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 232 (Ind. 2017) (citing J.L. and finding inadequate as 
reasonable suspicion a “tip provided by the taxi driver [that] made no ‘assertion of illegality,’ [but] 
rather merely had a ‘tendency to identify a determinate person’ who was in possession of a handgun”). 
122. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
123. Id. at 124–25. 
124. Id. 
125. United States v. Johnson, 482 Fed. App’x 137, 150 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that an officer 
who suspected criminal activity merely because the suspect had a prior criminal record had “little 
more than a hunch” of criminal activity); United States v. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that officer conducting a credit check could have “little more than a hunch” that a box inside 
a vehicle contained contraband). 
126. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25 (“[I]t was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy 
narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the 
police.”). 
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating Terry 
stop based on suspicion of gun possession in open-carry jurisdiction because such suspicion was 
nothing more than a “hunch”). 
128. United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807–08 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding stop based on 
suspicion of gun possession, furtive movements, flight, and presence in a high-crime area). Indeed, 
arguably even more should be required given the increasing legality of possessing guns in public, and 
thus the decreasing suspiciousness of that singular action. In any circumstance, unprovoked flight 
from police appears suspicious, even if standing alone it is insufficient to initiate a stop. Wardlow, 
528 U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight – wherever it occurs – is the consummate act of evasion: It is not 
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). Possessing a handgun 
in public, at least in a constitutional carry or shall issue state, would appear less suspicious than 
unprovoked flight, as it does not carry with it any automatic suggestion of criminality. 
06 - Fields (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 12/28/2018  4:26 PM 
1696 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1675 
 
A. The Need for “Gun Possession Plus” 
In the age of concealed carry, mere public possession of a firearm 
cannot give rise to more than a hunch that criminal activity is afoot. As a 
Florida state court declared in invalidating a stop based solely on a 
civilian’s admission to a police officer that a nearby person had a handgun 
in his waistband, possessing a concealed weapon “is not illegal in Florida 
unless the person does not have a concealed weapons permit, a fact that 
an officer cannot glean by mere observation.”129 
Despite this fact, courts regularly uphold Terry stops on just such 
grounds.130 On almost identical facts—a Florida civilian’s admission to a 
police officer that he had a gun in his waistband—the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld a stop and subsequent search of four men in a parking lot.131 In 
United States v. Lewis,132 two police officers approached four men in a 
parking and began what all parties agreed was a consensual encounter, in 
which the officers exchanged pleasantries with the men.133 The officers 
then asked “whether any of the men were carrying guns,” to which two of 
the men answered in the affirmative.134 “The deputies did not ask any 
follow up questions, such as whether [the men] had a valid permit for the 
firearms. Rather, the officers immediately drew their weapons and 
ordered all four men to sit down on the ground and show their hands.”135 
In invalidating the stop, the district court concluded that the officers 
“lacked any particularized and objective suspicion that any of the four 
men had been engaged in, or were about to engage in criminal activity at 
the time the officers ordered the men to the ground.”136 In particular, “it 
was neither per se unlawful to possess a handgun nor illegal to admit to 
carrying one, and . . . the police had no reason to believe that [the men] 
did not have a concealed-weapons permit for the firearm.”137 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that “[b]ased on McRae’s 
admission that he was carrying a handgun in his waistband, the officers 
                                                     
129. Regalado v. State, 25 So.3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
130. Bellin, supra note 20, at 28 (“The view that concealed handgun possession constitutes 
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop finds broad support in the lower federal courts.”). 
131. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2012). 
132. 674 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
133. Id. at 1300 (“Deputy Bojko asked ‘how you guys doing’ and tried to ‘start a casual 
conversation.’ Deputy Stiles similarly testified that the deputies introduced themselves and said, ‘Hey, 
gentlemen, how is it going.’”). 
134. Id.  
135. Id. at 1301. 
136. Id. at 1302. 
137. Id. 
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had reasonable suspicion to believe that McRae was committing a crime 
under Florida law—carrying a concealed weapon.”138 It did not matter to 
the Court that the officers could have asked during the consensual 
encounter whether McRae had a concealed weapons permit; in fact, the 
officers’ ignorance of this fact weighed in favor of the detention.139 
While the Court emphasized that “reasonable suspicion analysis is not 
concerned with ‘hard certainties, but with probabilities,’”140 it failed to 
explore what “probabilities” gave rise to the officers’ reasonable 
suspicion when all they observed was an activity that, on its face, is legal 
in Florida.141 Presumably, the Court would not uphold an officer’s 
detention of a motor vehicle driver based on nothing more than a suspicion 
that the driver did not have a license to operate the vehicle. But without 
more articulable facts, how does this hypothetical meaningfully differ? 
Both scenarios involve facially lawful conduct—possessing a concealed 
firearm and driving a motor vehicle—that requires a license. The only 
difference for practical purposes is that the former scenario involves an 
inherently dangerous instrument (a firearm) that poses a safety risk to the 
officer; but a safety risk alone cannot justify a stop under Terry.142 
However, while a bright line “gun possession plus” rule reflects a 
necessary adaptation of old post-Terry precedent to new factual realities, 
adopting the rule in practice may prove difficult. It can often be difficult 
for courts to discern after the fact whether a stop was made solely because 
of the presence of a firearm or because of additional articulable facts that 
may or may not have been part of the initial calculus. Moreover, defining 
                                                     
138. Id. at 1304. 
139. Id. at 1305 (“[T]he officers did not know that McRae lawfully possessed his firearm at the 
time of the detention . . . the reasonable suspicion inquiry focuses on the information available to the 
officers at the time of the stop—here, when the officers pulled their guns and ordered the four men to 
the ground—not information that the officers might later discover.”).  
140. Id. at 1304 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
141. Id. at 1312 n.4 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the State of Florida, pursuant to Fla. Stat. 
§ 790.01(2), it is not illegal for a person to carry a concealed weapon, provided he is also in possession 
of a valid state issued carrying permit, as was the case with Mr. McRae.”). 
142. See United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity is “required prior to a [protective] frisk” for weapons); In re Ilono H., 
210 Ariz. 473, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]n officer’s right to conduct a patdown search should 
be predicated on the officer’s right to initiate an investigatory stop in the first instance.”); Gomez v. 
United States, 597 A.2d 884, 890–91 (D.C. 1991) (observing that, without reasonable suspicion, 
police could not justify a frisk based on officer safety concerns alone); cf. Bellin, supra note 20 at 30–
31 (“[A] necessary implication of [Terry] is that guns can be seized, at least temporarily, under both 
prongs: either as part of the stop, if the gun possession is unlawful, or as part of the frisk, if the firearm 
makes the person ‘presently dangerous.’”). 
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these additional facts can be difficult, particularly in comparison to the 
dominant fact at issue—the presence of a firearm.143 
For example, in Schubert v. City of Springfield,144 the First Circuit held 
that an officer observing “a prominent criminal defense attorney” walking 
towards a courthouse in a “high-crime area” with a “handgun in a holster” 
had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the attorney.145 At some points 
in the opinion, the court appeared to justify the stop solely on the 
observation of the firearm: “[t]he officer observed Schubert walking 
toward the Springfield courthouse carrying a gun. This simple, undisputed 
fact provided a sufficient basis for Stern’s concern that Schubert may 
have been about to commit a criminal act.”146 Elsewhere in the opinion, 
however, the court appeared to rely on the presence of additional 
articulable facts, including that “the officer saw a man carrying a gun in a 
high-crime area, walking toward an important public building,”147 and that 
in the officer’s experience, “most people who carry firearms in 
Springfield are not licensed to do so.”148 Importantly, while the opinion is 
unclear whether the officer suspected a mere weapons violation or 
something more serious, the court clearly contemplated something 
potentially more catastrophic: “A Terry stop is intended for just such a 
situation, where . . . immediate action is required to ensure that any 
criminal activity is stopped or prevented.”149 
Conversely, in United States v. Mayo,150 the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
propriety of a Terry stop based solely on the suspicion that the individual 
illegally possessed a firearm.151 The court discussed in detail the variety 
of factors giving rise to the officers’ suspicion, including the “high-crime 
area” in which they found the suspect, the suspect’s placement of “his 
                                                     
143. See Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 2009). 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 499. 
146. Id. at 501, 502 n.4 (“The officer’s ground for suspicion was [sufficient] . . . as the officer here 
could confirm with his own eyes that Schubert indeed possessed a weapon.”).  
147. Id. at 501–02. 
148. Id. at 502 n.3.  
149. Id. at 502 (“We need not outline in detail the obvious and potentially horrific events that could 
have transpired had an officer noted a man walking toward the courthouse with a gun and chosen not 
to intervene.”). 
150. 361 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 2004). 
151. Id. at 803 (finding that the officers “had a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts 
that Mayo was possessing a concealed weapon”). While the opinion does not discuss Virginia’s 
concealed carry laws when this incident took place in 2003, Virginia became a mandatory, discretion-
less “shall issue” state in 1995. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-308.01–.015, 18.2-283, 18.2-283.1, 18.2-
287.01 (2018). 
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hand in his pocket and the appearance of something heavy in his pocket” 
upon viewing the marked patrol car, his evasive action upon seeing the 
vehicle, and his “unusually nervous” behavior upon being approached by 
the officers.152 While one of the factors pertained solely to his suspected 
firearm possession, the other three factors clearly existed independently 
of the “appearance of something heavy in his pocket.”153 Indeed, it 
appears the court could have upheld the stop under Wardlow without the 
firearm-possession suspicion, because the suspect was seen in a high-
crime area and he evaded the police. 
The Mayo court’s careful articulation of indicia of criminality 
independent from the suspected presence of a firearm should become the 
norm for adjudicating the validity of Terry stops in the future.154 But 
absent typically suspicious factors like evasion, furtive movements, flight, 
or presence in a high-crime area,155 how are officers to discern which 
public gun carriers are in lawful possession of their firearms and which 
ones are committing felony weapons violations? 
B. What Is “Reasonable Suspicion” of a Firearms Violation? 
Officers can develop reasonable suspicion that any type of criminal 
activity—not just a firearms violation—is afoot based at least in part on 
an individual’s suspected firearms possession. The officer in Terry 
                                                     
152. Mayo, 361 F.3d at 805–06.  
153. Id. at 807. 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding stop and 
frisk based in part on suspicion of gun possession because “(1) Mr. Hunter was in a high crime area, 
known for drug and firearm arrests; (2) Mr. Hunter was standing over and observing unlawful 
gambling; (3) Mr. Hunter saw the police approach and then began to walk quickly away; and (4) as 
Mr. Hunter turned to walk away, Officer Adams saw a bulge in his waistband.” (emphasis added)). 
155. The “presence in a high-crime area” indicator is particularly troubling in the context of 
concealed carry for two reasons. First, one presumably should not be punished for taking precautions 
to protect herself in a high-crime area, particularly given that Heller and McDonald make clear that 
the Second Amendment’s individual firearm guarantees stem from an individual’s rights to self-
protection. Second, and more fundamentally, the use of “presence in a high-crime area” as an indicator 
of criminal activity at all has the practical effect of criminalizing one’s presence in her own 
neighborhood. Moreover, several courts have recognized the danger in allowing “high-crime area 
designations [to] be permitted to serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.” United States v. Shank, 543 
F.3d 309, 322 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Schirf, No. 3:15-cr-00012-RRB-KFM, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 189190, at *12 (D. Ark. Aug. 18, 2015) (“[C]ourts have been instructed to carefully scrutinize 
claims that a particular area is a bad or high crime area to ensure the label is actually evidence-based, 
and not just a description that easily can serve as a proxy for race, ethnic, or socioeconomic 
profiling.”); see also Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty Five: A Revisionist’s View, 74 MISS. L.J. 
423, 493–94 (2004) (“By sanctioning investigative stops on little more than the area in which the stop 
takes place, the phrase ‘high crime area’ has the effect of criminalizing race.”).  
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suspected Mr. Terry was preparing to commit an armed robbery.156 But 
much of the case law discussing whether reasonable suspicion existed to 
stop an individual based solely on the presence of a firearm involved an 
officer’s suspicion that the suspect unlawfully possessed the weapon. For 
example, in the pre-Heller case Adams v. Williams,157 the U.S. Supreme 
Court suggested that possession of a concealed handgun, standing alone, 
constituted at least “reasonable suspicion” for a Terry stop and frisk even 
though the jurisdiction in question allowed gun possession with a 
permit.158 This reasoning needs reexamination. “Absent evidence that a 
person’s firearm possession is unlicensed, the first prong of Terry no 
longer justifies” a stop.159 So how does an officer determine whether a 
public gun carrier has the legal right to carry the firearm? 
Some state and local governments have attempted to legislate around 
this constitutional quandary by giving law enforcement greater authority 
to investigate the lawfulness of public gun possession.160 These 
governments have created a form of “gun-license inquiry” mechanism 
whereby, as a condition of receiving a concealed or open carry permit, 
firearms possessors agree to carry their licenses in public and willingly 
present them to police officers upon request.161 This approach has intuitive 
appeal, as it purports to create a voluntary, noninvasive encounter that 
allows officers to determine, at a minimum, whether a firearms licensing 
law has been violated.  
“If the person produces a valid license, the officer’s suspicions of 
a weapons-possession offense will be dispelled. If the person does 
not produce a valid license, the officer now possesses at least 
‘reasonable suspicion’ of a violation of the firearm licensing laws. 
The officer could confiscate the firearm and arrest the suspected 
offender.”162 
                                                     
156. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1968); see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 714 
(4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, even a lawfully possessed 
firearm can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness.”). 
157. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
158. Id. at 148–49.  
159. Bellin, supra note 20, at 31; see also Robinson, 846 F.3d at 709 n.1 (Harris, J., dissenting) 
(“We have held that in jurisdictions generally allowing public gun possession, police testimony that 
few law-abiding citizens take advantage of that right is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion 
for a Terry stop when a gun is publicly displayed.”). 
160. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 20, at 29–30 (discussing legislation in Georgia authorizing police 
officers to ask for documents confirming lawfulness of gun possession). 
161. Id. at 38–39. 
162. Id. at 39.  
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But this approach raises serious constitutional questions. While the 
licensing inquiry system arguably prevents a more invasive frisk from 
taking place, it assumes that the gun carrier has been lawfully stopped. 
Under a traditional Terry analysis, this would require the officer to have 
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed before being allowed 
to initiate the inquiry.163 While courts have upheld the validity of drivers 
license inquiries during a motor vehicle stop, as well as the arrest of 
individuals who fail to produce a driver’s license, in those cases the 
officers had a lawful reason to stop the individual—a suspected driving 
infraction.164 Likewise, in states requiring individuals to identify 
themselves to police officers, arrests following a failure to do so are only 
upheld as long as the stop was “justified at its inception” and the request 
for information “has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and 
practical demands of a Terry stop.”165 
Thus, under existing precedent, these gun-license inquiries can only 
survive constitutional scrutiny if the officer had some independent, lawful 
reason to initiate the Terry stop. “If the police cannot constitutionally 
require gun carriers to produce a license, officers cannot consider a failure 
to respond to a voluntary license inquiry as a basis for ‘reasonable 
suspicion.’”166 
It must also be considered whether a gun carrier has, by voluntarily 
agreeing to produce a gun permit upon request as a condition of the 
permit, effectively placed the interaction outside of Terry and into the 
voluntary innocent officer inquiry framework. Even if that were so, it does 
not solve the problem. A gun carrier can contract with the state to 
volunteer certain information to a police officer upon inquiry, but the 
police officer still will not know who has made such an agreement prior 
to asking the question. While of course a police officer is free to approach 
                                                     
163. Id. (“The framework’s constitutionality depends on whether police can compel gun carriers to 
stop what they are doing and produce a firearm license.”). 
164. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (confirming 
propriety of “ordinary inquiries incident to [a] traffic stop,” such as “checking the driver’s license”); 
Williams v. Vasquez, 62 Fed. App’x 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding constitutionality of stop 
where officer possessed probable cause to arrest for “failure to produce a valid [driver’s] license”).  
165. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004); see also Bellin, supra note 20, 
at 40 (“Gun-license-inquiry provisions purport to authorize police to request a license prior to the 
officer’s development of ‘reasonable suspicion’ to suspect a gun carrier of any offense. The proper 
analogy would be to a police officer pulling over a driver who had not violated any traffic law and 
asking the driver to produce a license . . . .”). 
166. Bellin, supra note 20, at 40; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding 
that without “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed . . . stopping 
an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license . . . [is] unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment”). 
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individuals and ask questions absent reasonable suspicion, individuals are 
free to refuse to cooperate.167 But in a “gun-license inquiry” state, would 
not refusal to cooperate indicate unlawful gun possession as a matter of 
logic? Such a scenario seems likely in a gun-license inquiry regime, but it 
would also turn Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on its head. “[A] 
refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of 
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”168 But in a 
jurisdiction where every law-abiding gun carrier has consented to 
cooperate with authorities, it would appear that an individual’s refusal to 
cooperate, without more, would create reasonable suspicion of unlawful 
weapons possession.169 
In short, in the absence of an agreement to engage in a consensual 
encounter with an officer, an individual remains free under the Fourth 
Amendment not to answer any questions from the officer unless the 
officer has reasonable suspicion independent of the refusal to cooperate 
to stop the individual. The fact that other civilians have decided to initiate 
an encounter with police ought not compel others to do the same or face 
an investigatory stop. 
However, officers still retain tools to develop reasonable suspicion of 
a weapons violation. In the absence of other indicia of criminality or the 
authority to demand proof of gun permits, officers can stop individuals 
who appear from specific and articulable facts not to meet the 
requirements to possess a concealed carry firearm.170 In “may issue” or 
“shall issue” jurisdictions, officers can lawfully stop individuals who 
appear not to meet the objective licensing requirements, such as the 
minimum age requirement.171 Moreover, if officers know an armed 
                                                     
167. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“We have consistently held that a refusal to 
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a 
detention or seizure.”). 
168. Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he person 
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no 
basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”). 
169. Concealed permit carriers are free to contract away certain Fourth Amendment rights. Zap v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (affirming surrender of Fourth Amendment rights); Jason S. 
Thaler, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or Constitutional Necessity?, 
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1794–95 (“The Supreme Court has affirmed the view that a person can 
surrender constitutional rights by contract. Individuals may voluntarily contract away Fourth 
Amendment rights.”). But their decision to do so should not strip away the robust Fourth Amendment 
protections of those who chose not to do so.  
170. GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 24 (noting that several 
concealed carry states have minimum age requirements between eighteen and twenty-one, while 
others require more discretionary showings such as “good moral character”). 
171. Id. 
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individual falls into one of the disqualifying classes for state permitting 
requirements—if the individual is a convicted felon, a domestic violence 
misdemeanant, or an undocumented immigrant, for example—the officer 
not only possesses reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop but also likely 
probable cause for an arrest.172 Likewise, in all jurisdictions, including 
unrestricted jurisdictions, officers may develop reasonable suspicion to 
lawfully stop individuals if they suspect the individuals are in violation of 
federal firearms possession laws.173 
III. THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC FRISKS OF GUN CARRIERS 
As the previous section illustrates, where the state legislature “has 
decided its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets,” the 
police have no authority to disregard this decision by subjecting law-
abiding citizens to Terry stops based on nothing more than suspicion of 
gun possession.174 But once a lawful Terry stop has been initiated, what 
level of reasonable suspicion is necessary to initiate a frisk? Must the 
officer determine through “specific and articulable facts” that the suspect 
is not only armed, but also dangerous?175 Can the officer simply rely on 
the actual or suspected presence of a firearm to conclude that the 
individual is “armed, and thus dangerous?”176 And should changing gun 
legislation and precedent affect the frisk analysis, as it does the stop 
analysis? 
Officers can satisfy the second Terry prong and conduct an automatic 
frisk based solely on the suspected presence of a firearm, but not for the 
reason articulated by courts and scholars. Rather than concluding that a 
frisk is proper because the individual poses a per se danger to the officer 
and the public,177 courts instead should conclude that a frisk is proper 
because the firearm poses an inherent and significant danger to the officer 
and the public. While the outcome remains the same, this subtle analytical 
                                                     
172. See id. 
173. Federal law criminalizes firearm possession by juveniles (under age eighteen), fugitives, 
felons, domestic violence misdemeanants, drug users, certain persons with mental illness, and 
undocumented immigrants. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (x)(2), (x)(5) (2012) (defining juveniles as those 
under eighteen). An officer’s reasonable suspicion that a public gun possessor fits into one of these 
categories would qualify as the “gun possession plus” necessary to initiate a stop and should also 
satisfy the “armed and dangerous” frisk prong. 
174. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131–33 (6th Cir. 2015).  
175. United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 709 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court for decades has adhered to the conjunctive ‘armed and dangerous’ formulation, giving 
no indication that ‘dangerous’ may be read out of the equation as an expendable redundancy.”). 
176. Id. at 700 (observing that the Court in Terry concluded that the suspect was “armed and thus 
presented a threat to the officer’s safety”). 
177. Id. at 705 (“[I]ndividuals who choose to carry firearms are inherently dangerous.”). 
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difference eliminates many normative value judgments about the 
individual while injecting some much-needed jurisprudential clarity about 
the inherent and potentially catastrophic danger posed by concealed 
firearms. It also dispenses with the implied requirement that officers rely 
on questionable and contradictory empirical data about the inherent 
dangerousness of concealed firearms carriers. In addition, by focusing the 
analysis on an objective fact—the presence of a firearm—rather than any 
subjective assessment of the gun carrier, this approach could help 
eliminate determinations made on the basis of invidious or implicit racial 
or social bias. 
While creating an objective standard for frisks of gun carriers may help 
promote objective enforcement without regard to race, it would be 
foolhardy to ignore the data confirming that stop and frisk practices are 
both disproportionately employed against people of color178 and are not 
particularly effective in creating community trust or efficiently fighting 
crime.179 In recognition of these facts, while the law and logic of stop and 
frisk authorize automatic frisks of gun carriers, officers and police 
departments ought to consider whether employing an automatic frisk 
regime makes sense as a matter of sound and just policing. 
A. Recognizing the Inherent Dangerousness of Firearms 
With respect to the “armed and dangerous” second Terry prong, courts 
ought to shift focus from the potential dangerousness of the individual to 
the inherent dangerousness of the firearm. While the outcome of cases 
employing such a shift would largely align with those adopting a per se 
dangerous individual position, this shift in reasoning is important in three 
respects. 
First, by refocusing the discussion on the inherent dangerousness of 
firearms in public places (which neither court rulings nor legislation has 
changed), courts can reaffirm the primary justification of limited weapons 
searches—to protect the officer and the public.180 Second, this approach 
                                                     
178. See Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias, VANITY FAIR 
(July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias 
[https://perma.cc/56HD-DABK] (citing “eighteen academic studies, legal rulings, and media 
investigations” highlighting the disproportionate use of stop and frisk practices and police violence 
against communities of color, including studies finding that officers were more than twice as likely 
to stop black and Latino drivers than white drivers and more than four times as likely to search black 
and Latino suspects than white suspects, but less likely to find contraband on black and Latino 
suspects than on white suspects). 
179. See infra note 222. 
180. See, e.g., Robinson, 846 F.3d at 700 (confirming that the original Terry frisk formulation 
centered on the officer’s safety and not on any evidentiary search or normative value judgments about 
the propriety of public weapons possession).  
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eliminates the need for officers to make split-second reasonableness 
decisions based on complex empirical data regarding the ubiquity of 
concealed and open carry permits, the prevalence of lawful versus 
unlawful weapons possession in a given jurisdiction, and the incidence of 
violence and criminality among the concealed carry permit population. 
Third, focusing on the objective fact that a weapon exists and not any 
subjective assessments of the individual injects a level of much-needed 
objectivity to the Terry analysis and eliminates the need to rely on ad hoc 
judgments grounded in implicit (or explicit) bias. 
1. Acknowledging the Inherent Dangerousness of Firearms 
Much of the discussion related to the second Terry prong in post-Heller 
cases centers on whether the armed individual stopped is dangerous. 
Courts have split over the issue whether an armed individual is 
automatically dangerous, or if an officer must show both that the 
individual is armed and also dangerous. For example, in United States v. 
Robinson,181 the Fourth Circuit held that any individual who the police 
suspect possesses a firearm becomes a dangerous individual per se for 
Terry purposes.182 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, in more limited 
discussions, similarly found that police had an automatic right to assume 
that an armed individual was necessarily dangerous.183 In contrast, in 
Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department,184 the Sixth Circuit held 
that, “[c]learly established law require[s] [officers] to point to evidence” 
that suspects are both “armed and dangerous.”185 Only in Robinson did 
the court discuss the dangerousness of the firearm, but the Court’s holding 
ultimately rested on the risk the individual posed to the police.186 
This focus on the individual is consistent with the language of Terry 
and its progeny, which asks whether the officer has “reason to believe that 
                                                     
181. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017). 
182. Id. at 704 (“[T]he officer reasonably believed that the person stopped ‘was armed and thus’ 
dangerous.”); cf. id. at 709 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining that “armed” and “dangerous” are two 
separate prongs of a conjunctive test). 
183. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 489 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding frisk justified on 
nothing more than the presence of a firearm); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2007) (same). 
184. 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015). 
185. Id. at 1132. 
186. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 705 (collecting cases observing the “inherently violent nature of 
firearms,” but concluding that “lawfully-stopped individuals armed with firearms are categorically 
dangerous” (emphasis added)). 
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he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.”187 Scholars on 
both sides of the argument also focus on the potential dangerousness of 
the individual holding the weapon rather than the weapon itself.188 
Supporters of the per se dangerousness approach focus on the precise 
language of Terry “for the proposition that all armed persons are 
inherently dangerous,” and that an officer must “tak[e] steps to assure 
himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a 
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.”189 
Critics of the per se dangerousness approach scoff at any suggestion that 
an armed individual in a concealed carry state is automatically dangerous, 
claiming that “there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors 
rarely use their firearms to commit violent street crimes such as robberies 
or murders.”190 
While neither position inherently lacks merit, each highlights the 
charged and philosophically opposed worldviews of gun ownership and 
possession—one in which gun owners are among the most reckless and 
dangerous members of society and one in which gun owners are among 
the most responsible and peaceful.191 These group-based conclusions 
about a class of individuals oversimplify the issue and obscure the 
undeniable objective fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous device 
created specifically and solely to inflict damage, and thus, that the 
                                                     
187. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  
188. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 20, at 32–33 (arguing against the automatic frisks of gun carriers, 
with reference to “the relatively small danger posed by gun carriers”); Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1176 
(advocating for automatic frisks and arguing that “[f]irearms—and the [p]ersons [w]ho [p]ossess 
[t]hem—[a]re [i]nherently [d]angerous for Terry [p]urposes”). 
189. Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1176–77. 
190. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32. While this may be true, to get to the second Terry prong an officer 
must already have developed a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Thus, even if in 
the aggregate licensed conceal gun carriers are law abiding, in the individual instance where the 
“armed and dangerousness” prong becomes a factor, that presumption of law abidingness no longer 
exists.  
191. See, e.g., David Rothkopf, Mad Men, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 9, 2013, 11:30 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/09/mad-men/ [https://perma.cc/SX4U-H5SN] (calling then-Senate 
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and other gun rights supporters more dangerous than Kim Jong 
Un for supporting “America’s out-of-control gun culture”); Jeb Golinkin, The Left’s Demonization of 
Gun Owners Has Gotten Out of Hand, WEEK (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://theweek.com/articles/465638/lefts-demonization-gun-owners-gotten-hand (last visited Oct. 12, 
2018); Matt Vespa, Study: Law-Abiding Firearms Owners Really Don’t Commit Gun Crimes (Which 
Is What We’ve Been Telling You All Along), TOWNHALL (July 31, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2016/07/31/study-lawabiding-firearm-owners-really-dont-
commit-gun-crimes-which-is-what-weve-been-telling-you-n2198793 [https://perma.cc/R2LV-
NZDJ].  
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presence of a firearm in a law enforcement encounter inherently increases 
the risks to public and officer safety. 
Many gun rights activists bristle at this notion, claiming that guns are 
only as dangerous as the people who use them.192 The argument often 
proceeds that devices should not be banned or otherwise tightly regulated 
just because those devices can be misused, such as a computer in the hands 
of a hacker.193 But a firearm differs in meaningful ways from a computer 
or other devices with multiple primary purposes beyond inflicting 
damage. In tort law, a firearm is considered an inherently dangerous 
instrumentality because it creates a substantial risk of harm just by its 
mere existence or use, irrespective of whether it is or can be misused.194 
A computer does not create such a substantial risk of harm, even if some 
risk does exist from its use. While constitutional doctrine ought not be 
determined solely by reference to private tort law principles, the analogy 
further highlights the recognized danger posed by a firearm regardless of 
the person in possession of it. Indeed, even when one court criticized a 
Terry stop based “solely on the ground that an individual possesses a 
gun,” it acknowledged “the obvious potential danger to officers and the 
public by a person in possession of a concealed gun in a crowd.”195 
Perhaps most telling, law enforcement training manuals themselves 
require officers to recognize the inherent dangerousness and lethal 
                                                     
192. See, e.g., Firearms Are NOT Inherently Dangerous!, GUNLINK BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://blog.gunlink.info/2012/01/12/firearms-are-not-inherently-dangerous/ 
[https://perma.cc/3YMH-R7HX] (noting “that you are 25 times more likely to be injured while riding 
a bicycle than while hunting . . . . [s]o next time someone makes the claim that firearms are inherently 
dangerous or that guns cause or enable crime, steer them to these facts”); DENNIS A. HENIGAN, “GUNS 
DON’T KILL PEOPLE, PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE” AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT GUNS AND GUN CONTROL 
1–5 (2016) (“[O]n radio or TV talk shows . . . [, o]ver and over again, I would hear, ‘Guns don’t kill 
people. People kill people.’ I would hear, ‘When guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns.’”). 
193. Firearms Are NOT Inherently Dangerous!, supra note 192 (“[Y]our chances of getting injured 
playing soccer are 34 times that of getting injured while hunting. And football? Forget about it! You’re 
over 100 times more likely to get injured playing tackle football than you are while hunting.”). 
194. See In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (noting the 
affirmative duties of care imposed on “manufacturers of firearms, an inherently dangerous 
instrumentality”); Smith v. Brooks, 545 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (observing that “a higher 
standard of care” applies because “a loaded firearm . . . amounted to an inherently dangerous 
instrumentality”). Courts in criminal cases have long referred to firearms as “inherently dangerous 
instrumentalit[ies]” for purposes of inferring intent. See, e.g., State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St. 2d 267, 
270, 431 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1982) (finding that a jury can infer intent to kill when a firearm is used, 
“[g]iven the fact that a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the use of which is 
reasonably likely to produce death . . .”); State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89371, 2008–Ohio–
1404 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008) (“A jury can infer intent to kill by the defendant’s use of a 
firearm, an inherently dangerous instrumentality . . . .”). 
195. Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
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capabilities of the firearms they carry.196 If a trained law enforcement 
officer is required to recognize the inherent dangerousness of her own 
firearm, then surely the law should allow her to recognize the inherent 
dangerousness of a firearm in the hands of a potentially untrained civilian. 
2. Limiting Reliance on Variable Data About Licensed Gun Carriers 
By allowing an officer to automatically frisk an individual upon 
reasonable suspicion that the individual possesses a firearm, this approach 
also absolves officers of any responsibility to take into account the 
imperfect and changing empirical data about the purported peaceful and 
law-abiding nature of licensed gun carriers. Such empirical data is often 
relied on by gun rights activists and litigants who argue that concealed 
carry permit holders deserve a presumption of law-abidingness.197 But 
such data only applies in the small remaining number of restrictive “may 
issue” jurisdictions and quickly becomes outdated as states relax or 
strengthen licensing requirements. Moreover, the very reliability of these 
studies is widely disputed by longitudinal studies linking public gun 
possession to violent behavior.198 Most importantly, requiring officers to 
make such real-time calculations based on data sets conflicts with Terry’s 
command that courts consider the perspective of the “policeman who in 
the course of an investigation ha[s] to make a quick decision as to how to 
protect himself and others from possible danger,” lest the “answer to [a] 
question propounded by the policeman . . . be a bullet.”199 
                                                     
196. See, e.g., CITY OF CINCINNATI, THE CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE MANUAL, 
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/procman.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6H6-K7P2] ; DIV. 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICE TRAINING COMM’N, N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, BASIC 
COURSE FIREARMS MANUAL http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/njptc/manuals/ 
BasicCourseFirearmsManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK39-JN6B] (requiring all firearms trainers to 
“stress [that] relevant safety shall be maintained by keeping all firearms’ muzzles pointed towards the 
ground” and requiring all trainees to “describe . . . the lethal capabilities of the agency handgun(s) 
and shotgun(s)”); OR. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY STANDARDS AND TRAINING, POLICE OFFICER FIELD 
TRAINING MANUAL, 
https://www.ci.medford.or.us/files/Police%20Field%20Training%20Manual%206-14-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5X7X-7AXX]. 
197. See, e.g., Brief for the Governors of Texas, Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 9–12, Peruta v. California, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (No. 16-894) (citing 
multiple studies purporting to show that concealed carry permit holders are “more than 10 times less 
likely to commit a crime in Texas as compared to the general population”). 
198. See Michael C. Monuteaux et al., Firearm Ownership and Violent Crime in the U.S., 49 AM. 
J. OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 207, 207–08 (2015). 
199. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63–64 (1968) (quoting 
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y. 2d 441, 446 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)) (decided on the 
same day as Terry). 
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Critics of the automatic frisk approach to public firearms possessors 
point to “the empirical data on the relative rarity of crimes committed by 
licensed gun carriers.”200 These critics contend that officers should not 
automatically determine that an armed person poses a danger to them or 
others because data about licensed gun carriers suggests the opposite.201 
Studies suggest that licensed gun possessors commit far fewer violent 
crimes than the citizenry at large, and that evidence combined with the 
heightened background check requirements necessary to procure a 
concealed carry permit ought to provide licensed gun carriers with an 
enhanced presumption of law abidingness.202 As Professor Jeffrey Bellin 
argues: 
Although there is a robust debate about the effect of gun carrying 
on crime, there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors 
rarely use their firearms to commit violent street crimes such as 
robberies or murders. Thus, even if licensed gun carriers swarm 
streets in the wake of the legal changes chronicled above, 
strategies to suppress murders and robberies through gun 
detection may remain viable so long as police can lawfully 
distinguish licensed from unlicensed gun carriers and disarm only 
the latter group.203 
This argument may support the claim that the presence of a gun alone 
should not justify a stop (because licensed gun possessors are less likely 
than average to commit a violent crime). But it misses the mark with 
respect to whether the presence of a gun should justify a frisk. First, the 
purpose of a frisk is to protect the officer and the nearby public, not to 
ferret out a potential violent crime plot.204 Searches based on less than 
                                                     
200. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32–33 (“Statistics published by the State of Texas reflect that people 
with concealed handgun licenses (CHL) commit only a small fraction of the street crime associated 
with public weapons possession. For example, of the roughly 4,000 people convicted for robbery or 
aggravated robbery in Texas in 2011, only two possessed a CHL. The same 2011 Texas data shows 
that CHL carriers included four (of over 500) convicted murderers, three (of 112) people convicted 
of manslaughter, and three (of 2,765) people convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.”). 
201. Id.   
202. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The available data about permit 
holders also imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low 
arrest rates observed to date for permit holders.”); Reconciling Stop and Frisk with Concealed Carry 
Laws, DUQ CRIM (Apr. 2, 2014, 12:57 PM), 
http://www.duqlawblogs.org/duqcrim/2014/04/reconciling-stop-and-frisk-with-conceal-carry-laws/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7TM-Y5AJ] (“As a conceal-carry permit holder . . . this signals to the officer that 
the individual passed a background check within the last 5 years which should afford the individual 
some presumption of law abidingness.”).  
203. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32–33. 
204. Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a frisk “is justified in order to 
protect the officer during an encounter”). 
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probable cause—such as Terry stops based on reasonable suspicion—
cannot be evidentiary in nature but are allowed only to the extent 
necessary to protect the officer and public. The officer already made that 
determination when she concluded there was reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity sufficient to initiate the stop. The presence of a firearm 
alone should justify the frisk, regardless of the presumptive law 
abidingness of a licensed gun carrier. Indeed, this presumption of law 
abidingness necessarily diminishes upon the officer’s development of 
reasonable suspicion that the armed individual is engaged in criminal 
activity. 
Second, empirical data about the incidence of crime for concealed carry 
permit holders has no relevance in unrestricted or “constitutional carry” 
jurisdictions where no permit is required. Indeed, to the extent the 
empirical data about the law abidingness of permit holders depends on the 
heightened background check requirements necessary to receive the 
permit, such findings could arguably weigh in favor of more expansive 
searches in unrestricted jurisdictions.205 If officers must give a 
presumption of peaceful law abidingness to permit holders in restrictive 
“may issue” states, no such presumption need be given in unrestricted 
states where anyone can carry a gun in public, subject to certain federal 
restrictions.206 
Third, the ongoing reliability of empirical data about licensed gun 
carriers depends on the static nature of the requirements for obtaining a 
gun license. In other words, an empirical study observing the violent 
tendencies of licensed concealed carry permit holders in Illinois would 
necessarily rely on a pool of licensed individuals who met the particular 
background check and other permit requirements in Illinois. Presumably, 
the more restrictive the requirements, the more law-abiding the pool of 
permit holders. By the same logic, as soon as Illinois changes its 
permitting requirements, the empirical data set becomes obsolete, at least 
to the Chicago beat cop charged with assessing dangerousness. As 
                                                     
205. Moore, 702 F.3d 933. Indeed, “[a] few studies find that states that allow concealed carriage of 
guns outside the home and impose minimal restrictions on obtaining a gun permit have experienced 
increases in assault rates.” See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: 
The Latest Evidence From 1977-2006, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 218, 224 (2009).  
206. Legislation introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2017, if passed, 
would further complicate the analysis for officers. The Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act would allow 
holders of a concealed carry permit in one state to carry loaded concealed firearms in all fifty states. 
It would allow people with permits “from states with weak permitting rules to carry into states with 
strict rules, like New York and California.” Melissa Jeltsen, The GOP’s Latest Gun Bill Would Be 
Catastrophic for Women Fleeing Abuse, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:47 AM) 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/concealed-carry-gun-bill-domestic-violence_us_5a26d1 
cce4b06d807b4f8a63 [https://perma.cc/34BH-Q5UX].  
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discussed above, states routinely change their permitting rules, and in the 
last three decades those changes have uniformly come in the form of 
relaxing permitting requirements.207 Thus, reliance on potentially 
outdated data about a more rigorously vetted pool of concealed carry 
permit holders would not only would be improper, but also dangerous. 
Fourth, significant studies directly contradict the data concerning the 
purported law abidingness of gun owners. One study, co-authored by 
Stanford Law professor John Donohue, found that “[l]aws in all 50 states 
permitting people to carry concealed firearms in public have been 
connected to a rise in violent crimes,” including “‘substantially higher 
rates’ of aggravated assault, rape, and robbery.”208 The study also found 
that from 1999 to 2010, firearm-related murder rates rose in eight states 
that adopted right-to-carry laws.209 Another study, more broadly 
considering the correlation between private legal gun ownership and 
violent tendencies (with or without a permit), concluded that firearms in 
the United States are “disproportionately owned by people who are prone 
to angry, impulsive behavior and have a potentially dangerous habit of 
keeping their guns close at hand.”210 
Advocates on both sides of the gun control debate have much 
ammunition in the form of conflicting studies to justify their preexisting 
positions. The Seventh Circuit nobly attempted to wade through the 
conflicting empirical data in Moore v. Madigan,211 in which it cited 
conflicting contemporary studies finding alternatively that an increase in 
                                                     
207. See supra section II.C.1.  
208. See Shadee Ashtari, Right-To-Carry Gun Laws Linked to Rise in Violent Crimes: Study, 
HUFFPOST (Nov. 14, 2014, 5:48 PM) (citing Ayres & Donohue, supra note 205, at 225), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/14/right-to-carry-laws-crime_n_6160414.html 
[https://perma.cc/7D4W-V2GE].  
209. Id.; see also Clifton B. Parker, Right-to-Carry Gun Laws Linked to Increase in Violent Crime, 
Stanford Research Shows, STANFORD REP. (Nov. 14, 2014), 
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/november/donohue-guns-study-111414.html 
[https://perma.cc/262J-5L9S] (“Now, Donohue and his colleagues have shown that extending the data 
yet another decade (1999-2010) provides the most convincing evidence to date that right-to-carry 
laws are associated with an increase in violent crime.”). 
210. Douglas Perry, Gun Ownership and Uncontrollable Anger Go Hand in Hand, New Study 
Concludes, OREGONIAN (Apr. 9, 2015, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2015/04/gun_ownership_and_uncontrollab.html 
[https://perma.cc/CDR8-8A5T]; see also Melissa Healy, Nearly 9% of Americans are Angry, 
Impulsive — and Have a Gun, Study Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-angry-impulsive-gun-access-20150408-
story.html?lang=en&utm_campaign=SendToFriend&uid=0&utm_content=article&utm_source=em
ail&part=sendtofriend&utm_medium=article&position=0&china_variant=False 
[https://perma.cc/M2AQ-Q32E] (citing study concluding that “people owning six or more guns were 
more likely to fall into both of these categories than people who owned a single gun”).  
211. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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gun ownership correlated with an increase in homicide rates, an increase 
in concealed carry permits correlated with an increase in assault rates but 
not homicide rates, and an increase in concealed carry permits correlated 
with a decrease in both homicide and assault rates. 
Based on findings from national law assessments, cross-national 
comparisons, and index studies, evidence is insufficient to 
determine whether the degree or intensity of firearms regulation 
is associated with decreased (or increased) violence. . . . 
Some studies have found that an increase in 
gun ownership causes an increase in homicide rates. . . . 
A few studies find that states that allow concealed carriage of 
guns outside the home and impose minimal restrictions on 
obtaining a gun permit have experienced increases in assault 
rates, though not in homicide rates. But it has not been shown that 
those increases persist. Of another, similar paper . . . it has been 
said that if they “had extended their analysis by one more year, 
they would have concluded that these laws [laws allowing 
concealed handguns to be carried in public] reduce crime.” . . . 
[B]ut they admit that data and modeling problems prevent a 
strong claim that they increase crime. 212 
Putting aside the dueling data sets, the larger point for stop and frisk 
purposes is that officers should not be required to wade through these 
conflicting studies to come to a conclusion about the reasonable likelihood 
that an armed person might be dangerous.213 Nor should they be subjected 
to a post hoc argument by a litigant challenging the protective frisk with 
reference to such data. Placing the frisk analysis on the presence of the 
inherently dangerous firearm eliminates these unfair and unworkable 
scenarios. 
3. Reducing Reliance on Implicit (and Explicit) Bias 
One of the most consistent and vociferous criticisms of Terry and the 
implications of its “reasonable suspicion” standard has been its potential 
for abuse by racist cops seeking to harass people of color on pretextual 
                                                     
212. Id. at 937–39. 
213. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (“In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s 
conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious 
behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement 
officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on 
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”). 
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grounds.214 For example, an officer can use something as minor as an 
apparent crack in a vehicle windshield as justification to stop a person of 
color on the ground that it constitutes reasonable suspicion the driver is 
violating a statute prohibiting driving “in an unsafe condition as to 
endanger any person.”215 The officer might then develop manufactured 
reasonable suspicion of dangerousness to justify a search for weapons 
based on preconceived notions about African Americans, Hispanics, or 
other minority groups.216 
This scenario is far from theoretical. In Maryland, from 1995 to 1997, 
a survey indicated that “70% of drivers stopped on Interstate 95 were 
African Americans,” although 17.5% of the drivers on the road were 
black.217 Videotapes in one Florida county demonstrated that 5% of the 
drivers appeared to be dark-skinned, but 70% of the drivers stopped were 
African American or Hispanic, and more than 80% of the cars searched 
on the highway belonged to persons of color.218 Moreover, traffic tickets 
were given in less than 1% of these stops.219 This appalling disparity does 
not result only from individual racist cops; explicit racial profiling tactics 
implemented by police forces across the country encourage aggressively 
focusing on people of color.220 
                                                     
214. Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review 
Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 569–70 (1997) (summarizing empirical data 
demonstrating disproportionate impact of Terry stops on minority groups and lamenting that Terry 
allows the use of “pretext stops, [letting] police avoid having to defend their use of race altogether”); 
Maclin, supra note 8, at 1287 (criticizing Terry as reflecting the Warren Court’s reluctance to “fight 
to ensure that blacks, the poor, and other ‘undesirables,’ would enjoy the same constitutional 
privileges possessed by the elite of American society”). 
215. Muse v. State, 807 A.2d 113, 119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
216. See, e.g., Judith Zaccaria, Police Video Draws Critics, COWLEY COURIER TRAVELER (May 
17, 2018), http://www.ctnewsonline.com/news/article_fdf3b7d6-5969-11e8-a0b4-
ef2e98922bb3.html [https://perma.cc/FC6B-MY5D] (describing police officer’s decision to stop an 
African American man because “he had not turned on his signal 100 feet before a turn,” and 
proceeding to justify a search of his car because he saw “some kind of vegetation in the window 
well”); Yesha Callahan, #DrivingWhileBlackWithLeavesOnTheWindshield: Kansas Man Detained 
for Having ‘Vegetation’ on Window, ROOT (May 20, 2018, 8:44 AM), 
https://www.theroot.com/drivingwhileblackwithleavesonthewindshield-kansas-man-1826176285 
[https://perma.cc/3M78-XBQG] (describing same incident and showing video recorded by suspect 
confirming that officer demanded suspect exit his vehicle purportedly because tree debris was stuck 
under his windshield wiper). 
217. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 36 (1999). 
218. Id. at 36–37. 
219. Id.  
220. Joseph Goldstein, Bronx Inspector Secretly Recorded, Suggests Race Is a Factor in a Police 
Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at A1–A21 (summarizing recording where commanding officer 
told his officers to frisk “the right people at the right time,” and later clarifying, “I have no problem 
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Explicit bias against communities of color is not the only cause of this 
disparate treatment. The groundbreaking science of implicit bias—the 
study of the “attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, 
actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner”221—has shed an 
uncomfortable light on the widespread implicit biases held by law 
enforcement personnel towards African American men and other people 
of color.222 While these implicit associations “do not necessarily align 
with [the] declared beliefs”223 of police officers, these “pervasive”224 
biases have been linked to disproportionate stops, searches, arrests, and 
killings of people of color by police officers.225 One study analyzing data 
from the police department in Oakland, California, found that “while 
black residents make up 28 percent of the Oakland population, they 
accounted for 60 percent of police stops . . . . [and] black men were four 
times more likely than white men to be searched during a traffic stop, even 
though officers were no more likely to recover contraband when searching 
black suspects.”226 
So what can automatic frisks for weapons do to reduce racial bias? In 
one respect, nothing. Authorizing automatic searches of individuals 
suspected of carrying firearms will do nothing to reduce this disturbing 
trend. An officer who stops a person of color may be more likely to 
suspect implicitly or explicitly that the person is armed and search that 
individual in a situation where he might not search a white suspect.227 But 
in situations where the officer knows the individual is carrying a firearm—
either through visual observation or the suspect’s own admission—an 
automatic protective frisk rule eliminates the possibility for implicit bias 
to affect the officer’s assessment of the “dangerousness” of the individual. 
                                                     
telling you this, male blacks 14, to 20, 21”); see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 540, 
577 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (finding NYPD stop and frisk practices unconstitutional because they 
disproportionately targeted African-American and Hispanic men). 
221. Understanding Implicit Bias, OHIO ST. U. KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/ 
[https://perma.cc/YQK7-A8LC].  
222. Kirsten Weir, Policing in Black & White, AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N (Dec. 2016), 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2016/12/cover-policing.aspx [https://perma.cc/82ZG-DFXK].   
223. OHIO ST. U. KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra note 221. 
224. Id. 
225. Weir, supra note 222. 
226. Id.  
227. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in 
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1012 (2007) (discussing implicit 
bias research suggesting unconscious racial bias harbored by law enforcement against African 
American men as reflected by officers’ faster response rates in shooting unarmed black men than 
unarmed white men). 
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In other words, if the analysis of whether to frisk turns on the objective 
presence of a firearm and not the subjective dangerousness of the 
individual, then any concern that the officer frisked the individual because 
he implicitly believes “black men are more dangerous” dissipates.228 This 
enhanced level of objectivity in the frisk analysis can thus promote the 
reduction of at least some of the subjective and pervasive biases implicitly 
projected towards groups of color.229 
B. Acknowledging the Consequences of an Automatic Frisk Regime 
But even if making frisks of gun carriers automatic may promote 
objectivity, civil rights activists may nonetheless scoff at the notion that 
lowering the burden for lawful frisks will benefit communities of color. 
This concern is valid and requires careful consideration. As noted above, 
these communities historically have been subjected to discriminatory 
over-policing, including racially charged stop and frisk practices.230 By 
advocating for a system wherein frisks become per se permissible in the 
presence of a firearm, this Article opens the door to more frisks—and 
more intrusive frisks—particularly in this lawful concealed carry age. The 
logical question then becomes whether expanding an often-misused law 
enforcement tool simply invites more abuses. 
More broadly, valid concerns have been raised about the efficacy of 
widespread stop and frisk practices, period.231 The most infamous stop 
                                                     
228. See Jenee Desmond-Harris, How Racist Stereotypes Make Police Bias Almost Impossible to 
Fight, VOX (May 5, 2015, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/5/5/8547473/police-racial-bias-
research [https://perma.cc/N6HU-NSYR] (interviewing Joshua Correll about his research on implicit 
bias, who summarized it thusly: “We think this represents an awareness of a cultural stereotype—not 
that our participants believe necessarily that black men are more dangerous than white men, but by 
virtue of movies they watch, music they listen to, etc., they’re getting the idea that black male goes 
with violent. The group and the idea are linked together in their minds whether they agree with that 
stereotype or not”). 
229. This position finds strong critics, who believe lower frisk standards for weapons will 
exacerbate racial profiling and discrimination. See United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (warning that once a state legalizes the public possession of 
firearms, unchecked police discretion to single out anyone carrying a gun gives rise to “the potential 
for intentional or unintentional discrimination based on neighborhood, class, race, or ethnicity”); 
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 542 (4th Cir. 2013) (harshly criticizing other purportedly 
“objective” factors such as “presence in a high crime area at night,” which, if “sufficient justification 
for detention by law enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion that Fourth 
Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain race or class of people”). 
230. See supra section IV.A.3. 
231. Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of 
New York City’s “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1550 (2014) (contending that stop and frisk 
in New York “was an inherently unconstitutional approach to crime fighting that probably ‘worked’ 
precisely because of the very aspects that render it unconstitutional”); cf. Scott Pilutik, Frisk 
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and frisk practices existed in New York City during the early 2000s, when 
NYPD officers consciously and dramatically increased their use of on-
the-street stops and frisks to crack down on petty crimes.232 From 2004 to 
2012, over 4.4 million people were stopped and frisked, including over 
685,000 in 2011 alone.233 Several studies have concluded that the type of 
quasi-dragnet style practices employed by the NYPD and other large 
departments have resulted in a significant misallocation of precious 
resources focused on harassing innocent people and nonviolent 
misdemeanants at the expense of apprehending serious criminals.234 In 
addition, these invasive practices may exacerbate distrust and antagonism 
between police and communities police depend on in gathering evidence 
and fighting crime.235 
                                                     
Assessment, SLATE (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:49 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/08/new-
yorks-stop-and-frisk-policy-is-neither-effective-nor-constitutional.html [https://perma.cc/R3Q3-
U772] (arguing that stop and frisk in New York was ineffective because contraband was rarely found 
during stops); Emily Badger, 12 Years of Data from New York City Suggest Stop-and-Frisk Wasn’t 
That Effective, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/21/12-years-of-data-from-new-york-city-
suggest-stop-and-frisk-wasnt-that-effective/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.66b4b4886a69 
[https://perma.cc/KRZ2-F6EQ]; David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk 
Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 866 (2013) ( “The fact that 
almost ninety percent of stops and frisks [by the NYPD] produced nothing showed just how 
ineffective the tactic was.”); Dennis C. Smith, Stop and Frisk Has Lowered Crime in Other Cities, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012, 2:03 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/17/does-
stop-and-frisk-reduce-crime/stop-and-frisk-has-lowered-crime-in-other-cities 
[https://perma.cc/79YE-MMXG] (“Research has converged on the conclusion that a shift from 
reactive to proactive policing [such as stop and frisk] by the N.Y.P.D. has played the crucial role in 
what the criminologist Franklin Zimring called a ‘Guinness Book of World Records crime drop.’”).  
232. Editorial, Stop and Frisk Works, NAT’L REV. (July 2, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2013/07/stop-and-frisk-works-editors/ [https://perma.cc/8G53-
KR74] (defending NYPD’s stop and frisk practices). 
233. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
234. Ivladimirova, Stop-and-Frisk: Out of 1,324 Local Searches at Sheepshead-Nostrand Houses, 
Zero Guns Are Found, BKLYNER (July 24, 2012), https://bklyner.com/stop-and-frisk-sheepshead-
nostrand-houses-sheepshead-bay/ [https://perma.cc/QYB7-77BT] (suggesting that police officers’ 
saturation of low-income housing projects without finding any guns amounts to “a major waste of 
public resources”); cf. id. (“Supporters of the stop-and-frisk procedures say that the police concentrate 
their hubs of activity where violent crimes are most often reported . . . because police saturate certain 
areas, this becomes a deterrent for carrying a firearm.”). 
235. See Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 732 (2016) (“There is a large cost to current policing methods. Current 
policing creates distrust of law enforcement among the individuals targeted and in the community at 
large. Although stop-and-frisk is supposed to be a method of reducing crime, ironically, the distrust 
generated by stop-and-frisk makes it harder for police to solve or prevent crimes. Police aggression 
risks undermining a young person’s trust in all government institutions . . . the evidence is conclusive 
that stop-and-frisk, as practiced in cities such as St. Louis, Chicago, and New York, leads to a 
breakdown in trust by both the person subjected to one or more unwanted encounters, and by those 
who witness them.”). 
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This Article offers two observations in response to these legitimate 
concerns. First, many of the ills connected to stop and frisk misuse stem 
from the exceedingly low reasonable suspicion standard first articulated 
in Terry and lowered further in the last half century. Prior to Terry, the 
Fourth Amendment generally required that absent exigent circumstances, 
police were required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause to 
conduct a search; this provided both a heightened evidentiary showing 
and a judicial check to ensure the showing had been made.236 By making 
warrantless searches not only generally permissible but permissible based 
on a much lower standard,237 the Warren Court virtually assured that 
policing would become more invasive, more discretionary, and less 
subject to judicial checks. With far greater latitude to seize and conduct 
limited searches of individuals, officers have been afforded far more 
opportunities to overreach, abuse stop and frisk, and unfairly 
discriminate—consciously, unconsciously, in good faith, and in bad faith. 
Combined with the Court’s numerous exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule238 and ever-expanding qualified immunity doctrine,239 these abuses 
often go completely unchecked, even after the fact. 
Many have made convincing and passionate arguments that Terry was 
wrongly decided,240 that the concept of “reasonable suspicion” contradicts 
                                                     
236. See Dressler & Thomas, supra note 2. 
237. Terry v. Ohio, 362 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
238. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (Kane, J., concurring) 
(“The questionable deterrent effect and the increasing number of exceptions to it transform the 
exclusionary rule into a doctrine without substance.”); K. Dawn Milam, The Shifting Sands of 
Deterrence Theory and the Sixth Circuit’s Trouble with Suppression in United States v. Fofana, 92 
N.C. L. REV. 1426, 1439 (2014) (observing that “the Court’s increasing propensity to apply a 
proportionality test[] has resulted in a proliferation of exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Fofana 
illustrates the uncertainty that results from an analysis that heavily favors exceptions, which in turn 
decreases deterrence”); Pamela F. Mucklow, The Admissibility of Evidence of the Pre-Trial Exercise 
of Constitutional Rights, 37 COLO. LAW. 81, 84 (2008) (“There are a number of exceptions, and the 
number seems to be increasing as the U.S. Supreme Court becomes increasingly skeptical of the 
exclusionary rule.”).  
239. See Valdez v. Roybal, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1272 (D. N.M. 2016) (“[W]hile the Supreme 
Court may be expanding the qualified-immunity analysis in the Fourth Amendment context, it has 
not limited the doctrine in other areas. If anything, the Court’s survey of the Supreme Court’s qualified 
immunity precedent demonstrates the Supreme Court’s general expansion of qualified immunity in 
all areas.”); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. 62, 64 (2016) (“[T]he Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly broadening the defense, 
describing it in increasingly generous terms and inexplicably adding qualifiers to precedent that then 
take on a life of their own.”). 
240. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police 
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1286 (1998) (articulating view that “Terry was wrongly 
decided,” in part because “the Fourth Amendment required probable cause of criminal conduct before 
officers could search the inside of a car,” and “clear thinking recognizes that the respect and privacy 
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the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment,241 and that a return to 
probable cause and the warrant requirement is necessary to reclaim the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.242 While these arguments are 
compelling, this Article situates itself within the reality of contemporary 
Court precedent and works within that framework. Many have forcefully 
and compellingly argued that stop and frisk itself represents an 
unconstitutional watering down of the Fourth Amendment’s primary 
purpose of requiring warrants based on probable cause. This position, 
while valid, fails to account for the jurisprudential world in which we live. 
By declining to recommend upending fifty years of post-Terry case law, 
this Article ponders not whether stop and frisk should exist at all, but how 
the reality of stop and frisk can and should adapt to our new concealed 
carry world. 
Second, one would be wise to remember that something may be legally 
permissible without necessarily being wise as a practice or policy. Under 
the current two-pronged test for reasonable suspicion, courts should 
recognize an officer’s ability to lawfully frisk any armed individual who 
was lawfully stopped under reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. But 
while an officer may exercise this ability, she need not do so. Indeed, 
given the invasiveness of thorough officer pat-downs,243 the indignity 
                                                     
associated with our bodies at least matches the privacy accorded automobiles”); Addressing Declining 
Rights in an Era of Declining Crime, 9 J.L. & POL’Y. 215, 230 (2001) (remarks of Professor Maclin) 
(“I think Terry was wrongly decided from the start in 1968, even when probable cause had more teeth 
to it. The problem with Terry is not that there was reasonable suspicion there, but that a police 
suspicion standard was used.”). 
241. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016) 
(arguing that the original meaning and intent of the Fourth Amendment equated “reasonableness” 
with a warrant). 
242. See Ross, supra note 235, at 732–33 (“It has been almost fifty years since Terry v. Ohio created 
the stop-and-frisk exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard, and it did so based 
on a cost-benefit analysis . . . . There is now data available for a Court to test its assumptions about 
the benefits and harms of stop-and-frisk . . . . Although Terry v. Ohio was decided almost fifty years 
ago, the doctrine is ripe for review.”). 
243. The invasiveness and emotional toll of a frisk in particular should garner careful scrutiny as 
police departments consider whether to implement large scale stop and frisk practices, as it is this 
intrusion that helps create lasting distrust between police and citizens. As Justice Scalia noted in a 
concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381–82 (1993): 
I frankly doubt . . . whether the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would 
have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to 
such indignity—which is described as follows in a police manual: Check the subject’s neck and 
collar. A check should be made under the subject’s arm. Next a check should be made of the 
upper back. The lower back should also be checked. . . . A check should be made of the upper 
part of the man’s chest and the lower region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment 
spot, should be checked. The inside thigh and crotch area also should be searched. The legs 
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often experienced by those subjected to frisks, and the attendant 
antagonism and distrust that frisking engenders within communities,244 
police departments should consider whether adopting an automatic frisk 
regime when weapons are present makes sound policy.245 
Many have proposed alternatives to traditionally invasive stop and frisk 
policing as a way of building trust within communities while still keeping 
the peace and investigating crime, such as community policing,246 focused 
deterrence,247 and infrastructure improvements.248 These alternatives 
should be explored further. While frisking an armed individual is justified 
by the Court’s current reasonable suspicion analysis, and in some 
circumstances certainly remains the safest and soundest approach, this 
Article by no means suggests that automatic frisks always reflect the best 
option. 
                                                     
should be checked for possible weapons. The last items to be checked are the shoes and cuffs of 
the subject. J. Moynahan, Police Searching Procedures 7 (1963) (citations omitted). 
Id. (Scalia, J. Concurring). 
244. See Ross, supra note 235 at 722–23; Maclin, supra note 8. 
245. Ross, supra note 235 at 732; see also Tara Culp-Ressler, Why Stop-and-Frisk Could Be Bad 
for Americans’ Health, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 17, 2014, 1:24 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/why-
stop-and-frisk-could-be-bad-for-americans-health-ca403b384520/ [https://perma.cc/YB4T-TNDT] 
(summarizing studies finding that individuals “who frequently have intrusive encounters with the 
police report increased levels of anxiety and trauma”); Joshua Rhett Miller, Man Sues Cop for Anal 
Probe on Sidewalk, N.Y. POST (July 19, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/07/19/man-sues-
cop-for-anal-probe-on-sidewalk/ [https://perma.cc/DH2F-5MW9] (“A man in Washington, DC, is 
suing a police officer for probing his anus and grabbing his genitals in an invasive body search during 
a stop-and-frisk last year.”). 
246. Graham Kates, Examining Alternatives to “Stop-and-Frisk”, CRIME REPORT (Nov. 15, 2013), 
https://thecrimereport.org/2013/11/15/2013-11-examining-alternatives-to-stop-and-frisk/# 
[https://perma.cc/6D5E-FGNT] (describing “a series of unorthodox initiatives” taken by the Orlando 
Police Department to combat crime in one complex, including “sponsor[ing] GED classes, counseling 
for emotionally-scarred kids too used to the sounds of gunfire; [and] police help[ing] residents ‘spruce 
up’ the buildings with new shrubbery and paint. Crime at the complex dropped 32 percent”). 
247. James Forman, Jr. & Trevor Stutz, Beyond Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at A23 
(“[F]ocused deterrence is in many ways the opposite of stopping and frisking large sections of the 
population. Beginning with the recognition that a small cohort of young men are responsible for most 
of the violent crime in minority neighborhoods, it targets the worst culprits for intensive investigation 
and criminal prosecution. Focused deterrence also builds up community trust in the police, who are 
now going after the real bad guys instead of harassing innocent bystanders in an effort to score easy 
arrests.”). 
248. Conor Friedersdorf, How to Stop Violent Crime Without Stop and Frisk, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/how-to-stop-violent-crime-without-
stop-and-frisk/278975/ [https://perma.cc/824U-94CH] (“Infrastructure improvements as varied as 
better-lit streets and air-conditioned community centers open late in dangerous neighborhoods during 
the summer seem like they’re worth trying.”). 
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C. To Disarm or Not Disarm? 
A final question requires consideration: even an automatic frisk for 
firearms during a Terry stop is justifiable, should the officer be allowed to 
physically disarm the individual? “Weapons seizures are not an explicit 
part of the Terry framework, but a necessary implication of the case is that 
guns can be seized, at least temporarily, . . . if the firearm makes the 
person ‘presently dangerous.’”249 Although the past assumption “that a 
person carrying a concealed weapon was engaged in the crime of unlawful 
weapons possession” no longer suffices to disarm an individual “with 
little analysis,” a recognition of the inherent dangerousness of guns should 
allow for an automatic temporary disarming of the individual during a 
lawful stop.250 Indeed, “[c]ourts may agree that the inherent dangers of 
firearms makes this showing essentially automatic whenever officers 
encounter armed persons in public.”251 
Critics of this approach point to Terry’s requirement that there be 
“specific, articulable” facts to justify a stop and that pointing merely to 
the presence of a firearm is insufficiently specific or articulable.252 But 
why? A single objective indicator of criminality (such as the possession 
of heroin) is more than sufficiently specific and articulable to justify a stop 
because a stop is warranted when there is suspicion of criminal activity. It 
follows then that a single objective indicator of dangerousness (such as a 
concealed firearm) ought to be sufficiently specific and articulable to 
justify a frisk. In other words, if the analysis turns on the objective 
presence of a firearm and the recognition of its inherent danger, as it 
should, then these facts alone should be specific enough to justify both a 
weapons frisk and a temporary disarmament if firearms are found.253 
This does not mean the “specific and articulable facts” threshold 
becomes obsolete in the second prong Terry analysis. Rather, courts will 
focus on the specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable 
                                                     
249. Bellin, supra note 20, at 30–31 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 
2004)). 
250. Id. at 31. 
251. Id. at 31; see also United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 705 (4th Cir. 2014). 
252. See Robinson, 846 F.3d at 713–14 (Harris, J., dissenting) (“Absent some ‘specific, 
articulable suspicion of danger’ in a particular case . . . West Virginia’s citizens, including its police 
officers, must trust their state’s considered judgment that the benefits of its approach to public gun 
possession outweigh the risks.” (quoting United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 168–69 (4th Cir. 
1998))). 
253. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 489 (10th Cir. 2013) (“No officer reasonably 
suspecting criminal activity . . . ’should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer 
might be a bullet.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
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suspicion that the individual possessed a firearm, not on whether the 
armed individual was dangerous.254 This shift from whether certain 
indicators suggested that the armed person is dangerous to whether certain 
indicators suggested that the person was armed may help eliminate the 
subjectivity of Terry stops and frisks so frequently cited as a reason to rein 
in the doctrine or overrule Terry altogether. While subjective assessments 
and conscious or unconscious biases of police officers can never be 
eliminated entirely, requiring officers to articulate facts as to why they 
believed a suspect was armed rather than why a suspect was dangerous at 
least moves the analysis away from the potentially troublesome 
assessments of the person and towards the objective presence of the 
firearm.255 
Indeed, even those who criticize this blanket approach admit that, 
absent some enhanced law enforcement authority to frisk and disarm, 
“officers will be forced to interact with armed citizens on equal 
terms . . . . That fact itself may discourage investigations of armed 
individuals . . . . The most common reaction of officers in the new gun-
friendly era to tips, observations, or discoveries of concealed weapons 
may be to steer clear.”256 In an increasingly concealed carry world, civil 
society needs the opposite reaction from its peace officers. We need 
increased engagement from police officers to ensure the safety of all 
citizens—both armed and unarmed—where, in this concealed carry 
world, public streets, restaurants, banks, bars, parades, and protests are 
flooded with lethal and inherently dangerous weapons. 
CONCLUSION 
The number of private firearms in this country now exceed the number 
of people physically present in the country.257 All fifty states and the 
District of Columbia authorize public concealed carry of these firearms 
                                                     
254. Id. at 488 (“Officer Munoz saw the handgun because Defendant was bending over stocking 
shelves . . . providing the officer all the suspicion he needed . . .”); United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 
802, 803 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Officer Cornett observed that Mayo ‘either . . . had something heavy in 
[his] pocket or he was pushing his hand down’ into the pocket, a movement that Officer Cornett 
believed was consistent with an individual’s effort to maintain control of a weapon while moving.”). 
255. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 220.  
256. Bellin, supra note 20, at 32. 
257. Christopher Ingraham, There Are Now More Guns Than People in the United States, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/05/guns-in-the-
united-states-one-for-every-man-woman-and-child-and-then-some/?utm_term=.7fa1031d06f1 
[https://perma.cc/9HNY-84E7].  
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by civilians.258 Forty-two of these states impose little or no restrictions on 
who can carry these weapons or where they can carry them.259 The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent recognition of a fundamental right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense further colors the changing national 
landscape and conversation surrounding the public possession of 
firearms.260 
This changing landscape poses obvious and significant challenges for 
police officers, who have traditionally initiated lawful stops and frisks of 
publicly armed individuals on the assumption that a crime was being 
committed by a dangerous person. That assumption seems increasingly 
unreliable. In this brave new world, officers should develop other indicia 
of suspected criminality beyond mere gun possession to satisfy the 
“reasonable suspicion” of criminality standard to initiate a stop under 
Terry. But once that lawful stop has been initiated, officers should have 
the right to automatically frisk and disarm a public gun carrier, regardless 
of the suspected dangerousness of the individual, in recognition of the 
need to protect the officer and nearby public from the possible use of the 
inherently dangerous and destructive firearm. 
In making these recommendations, the author recognizes that “the 
framework described above would place a unique burden on handgun 
carriers,”261 one that should receive careful scrutiny in light of the 
framework’s infringement on recognized Second Amendment rights and 
the intrusion into the “sanctity of the person” entailed by frisks. But while 
the abridgement of constitutional rights should not be taken lightly, the 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for personal protection 
does not (yet) encompass the right to be free from inquiries regarding 
firearms, pat downs and other temporary searches to identify the presence 
of firearms, or even brief relinquishment of firearms during the course of 
a lawful investigatory stop.262 
                                                     
258. GIFFORDS LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 24 (“Every state–as well as the 
District of Columbia–allows the carrying of concealed weapons in some form.”). 
259. Id. (listing twelve states where no permit is required, fifteen “no discretion” shall issue states, 
and fifteen “limited discretion” shall issue states). 
260. See section II.C.2. 
261. Bellin, supra note 20, at 42. 
262. Miller, supra note 100, at 1295 (“Part of the problem is Heller’s imprecision on what it means 
by ‘self-defense.’”); cf. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that Heller “does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the 
home . . . . To put it simply, concealed carry per se does not fall outside the scope of the right to bear 
arms; but insistence upon a particular mode of carry does”); Bellin, supra note 20, at 30 (“Expanding 
gun rights also restrict the actions police can take when interacting with armed citizens. The 
widespread assumption in urban areas that armed people can be, at least temporarily, disarmed during 
police encounters may no longer hold sway in a post-Heller world.”). 
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Moreover, the exercise of one’s Second Amendment right inherently 
carries with it the exercise of enormous power. The right to carry a loaded 
firearm gives an individual the right to carry an instrument designed to 
inflict incredible damage and with the ability of ending numerous lives in 
a matter of seconds.263 Moreover, because the exercise of one’s Second 
Amendment right includes carrying a loaded firearm, the Constitution 
grants an individual the right to carry an instrument designed to inflict 
incredible damage and capable of ending numerous lives in a matter of 
seconds. The exercise of this right inherently carries with it the exercise 
of enormous power, and “with great power comes great responsibility.”264 
Part of that responsibility ought to include, at a minimum, the ability of a 
peace officer to protect herself and the public by frisking, temporarily 
disarming, and determining the dangerousness of the individual 
exercising the right. A civilian relying on police officers to maintain their 
safety in public should demand no less. 
 
                                                     
263. McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986) (“[A] gun is an article that is typically 
and characteristically dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one, 
and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous . . . .”); United States v. 
Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (characterizing a “loaded gun [as] by any measure 
an inherently dangerous weapon”); Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing “the substantial risk of danger and the inherently violent nature of firearms”); Love v. 
Tippy, 133 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing “the inherently violent nature of firearms, 
and the danger firearms pose to all members of society”); United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 40 (2nd 
Cir. 1997) (“[F]irearms are inherently dangerous devices . . . .”). 
264. Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for 
Clarification, U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 426 (2008) (“The power to take another human life” with a 
firearm entails with it enormous responsibility). 
